


























THE 1958 GENEVA CONVENTION ON THE 
CONTINENTAL SHELF 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Convention on the Continental Shelf/ signed. by a majority of 
the 86 states attending the United Nations Conference on the Law of 
the Sea at Geneva, Switzerland, :from February 24 to April 28, 1958,2 
represents the most rapid and successful development of an important 
aspect of the law of the sea ever achieved. 
Born as a legal concept in the 1945 Truman' Proclamation,3 the 
continental shelf doctrine has grown to full stature in a scant fifteen 
years. As a new concept in international law it has met with wide-
spread support in the world community of states, and has taken its 
place alongside the older and more venerated concepts of "freedom 
of the high seas," "territorial sea," and "contiguous zones" as an 
established part of the contemporary international law. 
By 31 October 1958, the terminal date for signatures to the Conven-
tion on the Continental Shelf, as well as for the three other Conven-
tions adopted in Geneva at the same time, 4 46 states had signed, 
including the United States, Canada, and all of the other large mari-
time states in the Western Hemisphere except Brazil and Mexico.5 
Especially encouraging is the fact that the U.S.S.R. has aJso signed 
1 Adopted 26 April1958, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 55. 
2 Following is a complete list of the 46 states signing: Afghanistan, Argentina, 
Australia, Bulgaria, Byelorussian S.S.R., Canada, Ce~lon, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Finland, Germany (Federal Republic), Ghana, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Nepal, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Switzerland, Thai-
land, Tunisia, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, United States of 
America, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. For comparative lists of the 
52 states which have signed one or more of the four conventions, see Appendix J. 
3 Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, 28 September 1945, 59 Stat. 884. 
4 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF. 13/L. 52); Convention on the High Seas (U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 
53/Corr. 1) ; Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources 
of the High Seas (U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 54/Add. 1). 
6 Since both 1\'lexico ( 1945) and Brazil ( 1950) have asserted claims to their 
respective continental shelves, it seems reasonable to assume that they support 
the continental shelf concept, even though their disagreement with the exact 
language of the Convention has caused them to refrain from signing. 
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the Convention without reservations, even though she has never issued 
a proclamation or decree laying claim to the vast continental shelves 
off her coasts.6 Similarly, although not surprisingly, Soviet bloc 
countries have also signed the Convention without reservation. 
But the successful development of this newest aspect of the law of 
the sea is not to be 1neasured alone in terms of the extent to which the 
leading bipolar powers of the world have agreed to the articles of the 
Geneva Convention. The really significant fact is that when science 
and technology had developed sufficiently to permit the exploitation 
of the much-needed resources of the continental shelf,7 and various 
coastal states had begun to assert claims to these resources,8 the Inter-
national Law Commission, charged by the General Assembly with 
codifying and developing internationallaw,9 vigorously undertook a 
systematic study of this new potential use of the high seas,t0 concur-
rently with similar studies by several international associations.11 
6 According to recent tabulations by the United Nations Secretariat, 35 states 
have formally claimed their continental shelves (U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 19/4 
8 Feb. 1960). That the number of claims is not larger is due chiefly to the fact 
that many states believe that since the continental shelf belongs to the coastal 
state ipso jure, a proclamation or decree is unnecessary. The Convention so 
provides in Art. 2 ( 3). 
7 For a summary of recent developments in the technology of exploiting the 
mineral resources of the continental shelf see Preparatory Document No. 20 
of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, prepared by the able 
Netherlands lawyer, M. W. Mouton, Rear Admiral, Royal Netherlands Navy, 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/25 (1958). 
8 The States which asserted claims shortly after the United States Procla-
mation in 1945 were: Mexico (1945), Argentina (1946), Chile (1947), Peru 
(1947), Costa Rica (1948), Honduras (1948), Iceland (1948). See the Synoptical 
Table (Appendix K). 
9 General Assembly Resolution 174(II), 21 November 1947. Article 15 of the 
Statute of the International Law Commission defines the progressive develop-
ment of international law as "the preparation of draft conventions on subjects 
which have not yet been regulated by international law or in regard to which 
the law has not yet been sufficiently developed in the practice of States." 
Codification of international law is defined as "the more precise formulation and 
systematisation of rules of international law in fields where there already has 
been extensive State practice, precedent and doctrine." For discussions of the 
soundness of these distinctions see Jennings, "The Progressive Development of 
International Law and Its Codification," 24 B.Y.I.L. 301 (1947). For the history 
of the provision in the Statute of the International Law Commission see Yuen-li 
Liang, 42 A.J.I.L. 66 (1948). For an excellent historical survey of the develop-
ment of international law and its codification by international conferences, see 
41 A.J.I.L. Supp. 29- (1947). 
10At its first session in 1949 the International Law Commission placed the 
"regime of the high seas" on its provisional list of topics selected for codification. 
Report of First Sess. U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, 4th Sess. Supp. 10, 
Doc. A/1925, par.16, item 5 (1949). 
11 For example, see the several reports on "Rights to the Sea Bed and Its 
Subsoil," International Law, Association Biewnial Report, as follows: 43d Conf., 
607631-61--2 
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An effort was made to formulate a workable set of principles and rules 
which would reconcile the claims of the coastal states to the exclusive 
rights over the continental shelf resources with the competing claims 
of all maritime states to the free use of the high seas for navigation, 
fishing, cable and pipeline laying, scientific investigation, and other 
uses. 
The Convention on the Continental Shelf, whatever its deficiencies,12 
represents the culmination of a concerted effort to compromise rather 
diverse demands of states, each with different geographical features, 
Brussels (1948), pp. 168-206; 44th Conf., Copenhagen (1950), pp. 87-138; 45th 
Conf., Lucern (1952), pp. 143-179; 46th Conf., Edinburgh (1954). Also see 
International Bar Association Report, London (1950), pp. 183-197; Madrid 
( 1952) ' pp. 278-285. 
12 Opinions of writers vary as to whether the convention has serious defi-
ciencies. Richard Young says, "Nevertheless, despite these substantial merits, 
the Convention cannot be regarded as a wholly ,gatisfactory instrument. It is 
quite good, but not quite good enough." Young, "The Geneva Convention on the 
Continental Shelf: A First Impression," 52 A.J.I.L. 733 (1958). 
Arthur Dean, Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the Conference, appears 
enthusiastic in saying" ... [T]he Convention on the Continental Shelf .adopted at 
the Geneva Conference represents the first worldwide accord on the subject and is 
highly satisfactory to the United States." 52 A.J.I.L. 607, 619 (1958). Miss 
Marjorie M. Whiteman, a member of the U.S. Delegation and also of Committee 
IV which formulated the Convention on the Continental Shelf, seems to feel that 
the convention is open to criticism but that it represents a workable document 
which will influence "the content and direction of the developing international 
law" on this subject. She concludes: "Some may think that the Convention goes 
too far; others, perhaps a larger number, may think that it does not go far 
enough in certain of its aspects. Of course, whether it does or not is a matter 
of opinion; both views may be warranted in some measure." Whiteman, "Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea: Convention on the Continental Shelf," 52 A.J.I.L. 
629, 659 ( 1958). 
Professor Jessup is enthusiastic about the ~success of the entire conference, and 
particularly about the Convention on the Continental Shelf. He says: "At 
present it seems safe to say that it was a successful conference and that irrespec-
tive of the fate of some of the conventions, the Conference achieved enough 
clarification and a wide enough measure of agreement to have justified the very 
considerable effort." Jessup, "The United Nations Conference on the Law of 
the Sea," 59 Columbia Law Review 234 (1959). Of the Convention on the 
Continental Shelf he adds : "There are expectations that the Convention on the 
Continental Shelf may prove to be the most tangible success of the Con-
ference, ... " Ibid., p. 251. Also see Jessup, "The Geneva Conference on 
the Law of the Sea; A Study in International Law-Making," 52 A.J.I.L. 730 
(1958). Professor D. H. N. Johnson, a member of the United Kingdom delega-
tion to the Conference, while admitting the success of the Conference. is highly 
critical of many of the procedures followed and the preparations made. John-
son, "The Preparation of the 1958 Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea," 
8 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 122, 143 (1959). 
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economic conditions, political interests, technological abilities and 
legal perspectives. It is a mark of success that the convention was 
adopted at all; a further mark of success that the final vote of the 
Conference was so overwhelmingly favorable: 57 states voted for the 
Convention and only three against, with eight abstentions.13 
Finally, the Convention on the Continental Shelf, even 1nore than 
the other three conventions/4 may be considered a success in that the 
support for the first three of the seven substantive articles was so 
strong that the Conference excluded the possibility of any state mak-
ing reservations to these articles at the time of signature, ratification 
or accession.15 These three articles cover the definition of the con-
tinental shelf, the description of the sovereign rights of the coastal 
state, and the explicit limitation of those rights in that they do not 
affect freedom of the superjacent waters and the airspace above those 
"\vaters.16 Only three of the 46 states signing the Convention filed 
declarations or reservations to any of the articles other than the first 
three, and these were of minor importance.17 
Of course, whether the Convention on the Continental Shelf will 
eventually achieve widespread acceptance in the world community 
depends neither upon the number of states which voted for it at the 
Conference, nor upon the number signing the convention, but upon 
13 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/SR.18, 6 (1958). 
14 Ibid., note 1-3a. 
15 U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L.55, Art.12 (1958). 
16 Ibid., Art. 1-3. 
11 Germany (Federal Republic) filed a declaration with respect to Art. 5, 
par. 1 to the effect that in her opinion it "guarantees the exercise of fishing rights 
(Fischerei) in the waters above the continental shelf in the manner hitherto 
generally in practice." (Mimeographed summary by United Nations Secre-
tariat as to declarations and reservations made to all four conventions and the 
optional protocol at the time of signature.) Iran filed a reservation to Art. 4 
with respect to the phrase, "the Coastal State may not impede the laying or 
maintenance of submarine cables or pipe lines on the continental shelf," saying 
that the Iranian Government "reserves its right to allow or not to allow the 
laying or maintenance of submarine cables or pipe line·s on its continental shelf." 
Iran also made a reservation to Art. 6 with respect to the phrase, "and unless 
another boundary line is' justified by special circumstances," by saying that the 
Iranian Government "accepts this phrase on the understanding that one method 
of determining the boundary line in special circumstances would be that of 
measurement from the high water mark." (Ibid.) Venezuela also filed a 
reservation with reference to Art. 6, declaring "that there are special circum-
stances to be taken into consideration in the following areas: the Gulf of Paria, 
in so far as the boundary is not determined by existing agreements, and in zones 
_ adjacent thereto; the area between .the coast of Venezuela and the island of 
Aruba; and the Gulf of Venezuela." (Ibid.) 
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the number which finally ratify it. This fact will not be known for 
some time. As of 12 May 1961, eight states have ratified it. 
Moreover, the ultimate proof of the pudding is in the eating, not 
in the recipe. The final test of the success of the convention is 
whether it serves the purpose of achieving the maximum utilization 
of the continental shelf resources with the minimum of friction be-
tween the states of the world, and with adequate provision for the 
maximum utilization of all other resources of the high seas, including: 
navigation, fishing, communication, transportation,. scientific investi-
gation, weapons testing, security, and a host of new emerging uses.18 
B. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONTINENTAL 
SHELF CONCEPT 
I. Scientific Definition of the Continental Shelf 
In reviewing the literature in scientific publications regarding the 
continental shelf, 19 and in studying the discussions of the International 
Law Commission on the subject, 20 one is convinced that there are al-
most as many definitions and classifications of the continental shelf 
as there are writers on the subject. Particularly, one notes the differ-
ence between the geological-geographical definition of the continental 
shelf and the legal definition as finally formulated in the Geneva 
Convention of 1958. 
When geologists, geographers and other scientists use the ter1n 
"continental shelf" in a broad sense they mean the submarine exten-
sion of the "continent" outward into the sea; a kind of pedestal on 
which the continents seem to rest in the ocean, lying "between the 
shore and the first substantial fall-off, on the seaward side, whatever 
its depth." 21 This submarine plain, which :fringes all of the con-
tinents, but at varying widths from the shore, slopes gradually in 
most instances out to an edge at which the superja.cent water is ap-
proximately 200 meters or 100 fathoms in depth. When this edge is 
18 On the potential wealth o.f the seas see Carson, The Sea Around Us (1954) ; 
Smith and Chapin, The Sun, The Sea and Tomorrow (1954). 
19 Bourcart, Geographie du Fond Des lifers (1949) ; Guilcher, 111orphologie 
Littorale et Sous-marine (1954) ; Krummel, Handbuch der Ozeanographie 
(1907) ; Kuenen, lJ!larine Geology (1950) ; Shephard, Submarine Geology (1948) ; 
Sverdrup, Johnson and Fleming, The Oceans (1942); Umbgrove, The Pulse of 
the Earth (1949). Also see United Nations Preparatory Document No. 2, Scien-
tific Considerations Relating to the Continental Shelf, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 
13/2 (1957), and the citations therein (hereinafter cited as Prep. Doc. 2). 
20 See particularly the three principal reports on this subje,ct by the Inter-
national Law Commission to the General Assen1bly. U.N. Doc. A/1858 (1951) ; 
A/2456 ( 1953) ; A/3159 ( 19,56) . 
21 Bourcart, op. cit., footnote 19 (note 5-1 at 127). 
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reached the slope becomes steeper and is referred to as the continental 
slope.22 
However, the broad definition of the continental shelf has been 
refined in various ways by scientists, some of whom distinguish be-
tween "inner" and "outer" shelves,23 "continental" shelves and "in-
sular" shelves,'24 and "real" shelves and "false" shelves.25 
Perhaps we can best understand what the continental shelves are 
from a geological point of view if we visualize for a moment what 
the earth would look like if we removed all of the water (hydro-
sphere) from its surface. We would then see that the earth's crust 
(lithosphere) has two predominant features: ( 1) the continents to-
gether with their gradually sloping continental shelves, and (2) the 
deep ocean basins whose steep-sloping sides are referred to as con-
tinental slopes.~6 There are six such continents: North America, 
22 Following are the definitions adopted by the International Committee on the 
Nomenclature of Ocean Bottom Features, published by Wiseman and Ovey, 
"Definitions of Features on the Deep-sea Floor," Deep-Sea Research, Vol. I, 
No.1, pp.11-16 (Oct. 1953) : 
uaontinental Shelf, shelf edge and borderland. The zone around the con-
tinent, extending from the low-water line to the depth at which there is a marked 
increase of slope to greater depth. Where this increase occurs, the term shelf 
edge is appropriate. Conventionally, its edge is taken at 100 fathoms, or 200 
metres, but instances are known where the increase of slope occurs at more 
than 200 or less than 65 fathoms. When the zone below the low-water line is 
highly irregular, and includes depths well in excess of those typical of conti-
nental shelves, the term continental borderland is appropriate. 
"Continental slope. The declivity from the outer edge of the continental shelf 
or continental borderland into great depths·. 
"Continental terrace. The zone around the continents, extending from the 
low-water line, to the base of the continental slope. . . ." Prep. Doc. 2, p. 4. 
23 Umbgrove, op. cit., footnote 19 (Note 5-1 at 98). 
24 Prep Doc. 2, p. 4. Also see, Kuenen, op. cit., footnote 19 (note 5-1, at 104). 
25 Krummel, op. cit., footnote 19 (note 5-1 at 105). 
26 The experts who prepared Prep. Doc. 2, concluded at p. 5·: "In spite of the 
difficulties of defining the borderline between the continental shelf and the 
continental slope ... it is incontestable that the concept of continental shelf 
corresponds to a real feature. As a general rule, there exists in fact a shal-
lowly submerged zone along the edge of continents, of which the mean slope 
is markedly less steep than beyond, leading to the deep-sea floor. The reality 
of this feature can be demonstrated by the percentages of terrestrial surface 
occupied by three depth zones of the oceans ... : 
From 0 to 200 metres----------------------------------------- 7.6 per cent 
From 200 to 1000 metres-------------------------------------- 4.3 per cent 
From 1000 to 2000 metres------------------------~------------ 4.2 per cent 
"Since the area covered by bottoms lying between 0 and 200 metres is only 
_ slightly less than that between 200 ·and 2000 metres, a range of depth that is 
nine times as great, it is evident that the average slope is much steeper beyond 
200 metres than nearer shore." 
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South America, Europe-Asia, Africa, Australia and Antarctica. 
The first five of these continents are surrounded by a more or less 
continuous continental shelf of varying widths. Indeed, if the con-
tinent o:f Antarctica did not exist we might speak of the continental 
shelves o:f the earth in the singular because "all the other continents 
lie within the confines of a single encircling belt of shallow water 
which is essentially continuous-the continental shelf." ~ 7 
The configurations o:f the submarine areas o:f the three oceans 
(Pacific, Atlantic and Indian) vary greatly. 28 . Longitudinal ridges 
divide the oceans into elongated troughs "\Vhich in turn are often cut 
by transverse ridges, thus creating a number o:f deep ocean basins. 
Mountain peaks on some o:f the ridges rise almost abruptly out o:f the 
ocean depths to :form islands, some o:f which have little or no insular 
shelves. 
Now, if we poured back :from our mammoth container enough of 
the water to fill the deep ocean basins up to the outer edge o:f the 
continental shelf we would cover about 128,000,000 square miles, or 
approximately two-thirds of the earth's total surface. We would 
then have left, high and dry, the six continents including their con-
tinental shelves, whose total area would cover approximately 
68,500,000 square miles. O:f this total, the continental shelves o:f the 
world (including insular shelves) are estimated at approximately 
10,500,000 square miles, roughly 18 per cent o:f the 58,000,000 square 
miles o:f present dry land areas, an9. about 7.6 per cent o:f the total 
ocean areas o:f the world.29 It is worth observing in passing that 
while the stakes are high with respect to exploiting the resources o:f 
the continental shelves o:f the world in that these · shelves are equal 
to almost one-fifth o:f the land area of the world, the stakes will be 
even higher when science and technology discover ways o:f exploiting 
the deep ocean basins which are about twelve times the area o:f the 
continental shelves. 
21 Pratt, "Petroleum on the Continental Shelves," 31 Bulletin of American 
Association of Petroleum Geologists, 657 (1947). 
28 Sverdrup, Johnson and Fleming, op cit., footnote 19 (note 5-1 at 11). 
29 Umbgrove estimates the shelves of the world at 27,500,000 square kilometers, 
or 7.6 per cent of the surface of the oceans. Umbgrove, op. cit., footnote 19 (at 
99). Also see Sverdrup, op. cit., footnote 19 (note 5-1 at 21). 
Calculations here are those of the writer based upon figures given in Sverdrup 
et al., pp. 9-15. The total area of the surface of the earth is approximately 
197,000,000 square miles. Of this total, the area of the oceans, including adjacent 
seas, is approximately 139,000,000 square miles, leaving 58,000,000 square miles 
of land mass area. Of the submarine areas under the oceans, the continental and _ 
insular shelves comprise about 10112 million square miles, with the continental 
slopes and deep ocean areas totaling 128,500,000 square miles. 
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Then if we poured back the rest of the water remaining in our 
container after filling the deep ocean basins, it would spill over those 
basins on to the continental shelves up to the shore lines of the dry 
land areas of the earth. 
From a geological point of view, the present dry land areas of the 
world, which are traditionally referred to as continents, are only the 
major parts of the continents. More accurately, the continents in-
clude the present "dry land" areas totaling some 58,000,000 square 
miles plus their continental shelves of approximately 10,500,000 
square miles. 
Hence, when the continental shelves are defined it is important to 
stress this oneness of relationship of the shelves to their continents 
by referring to the shelves as the outrward extensions of the continents 
covered by comparatively shallow waters which, at approximately 
200 meters depth at the outer edges, drop off rather sharply down the 
continental slopes into the deep ocean basins. 30 
It should be emphasized that the continental shelves do not project 
out from the continents of which they are an integral part like huge 
awnings hanging from the sides of a building. On the contrary, the 
continental shelves are generally the outward parts of a shelving 
plain extending inland from the shoreline to the foothills of the conti-
nental heights and extending outward from the shoreline under the 
ocean waters to the edge of the deep ocean basins. In some parts of 
the world, notably off the west coast of South America (in particular, 
off the coasts of Peru and Chile), and off the east coast of Africa, 
there is practically no continental shelf, the edge of the steep-sided 
ocean basin coming almost to the shoreline. This geological fact has 
given rise to some legal problems :in connection with the extensive 
claims to sovereignty over the high seas by certain South American 
countries, notably Chile, Ecuador, and Peru.31 
30 Rutten, ed., "Geological Nomenclator" 7 (1929). The continental shelf 
is described as, "the submarine continuation of the continent area up to about 
the 100 fathom line." (Emphasis added.) Also see Prep. Doc. 2, which says 
at p. 13: " ... [T]he shelf is a borderline area alternately submerged and ex-
posed a true extension of the neighbouring continents." (Emphasis added.) 
31 See Appendix K for a Synoptical Table of Claims to the Continental Shelf. 
The problems involved are discussed in detail, infra, pp. 51-58. It is particularly 
encouraging to note that although Chile, Ecuador, and Peru have not officially 
changed their claims of a 200-mile breadth of continental shelf, including sov-
ereignty over the superjacent waters without reference to the depth of those 
waters, all three countries have signed the Convention on the Continental Shelf 
_ (see Appendix J). Since Article 3 of that Convention provides that "the rights 
of the coastal State over the continental. shelf do not affect the legal status of 
the superjacent waters as high seas ... ," a provision which is contrary to their 
previous unilateral claims, it is hoped that by signing the Convention these three 
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All maps tend to give an incorrect perspective of the true conti-
nental shelves because they show the shelves as beginning at the shore 
lines of the continents, whereas in fact that part of each shelf which 
begins at the water's edge and runs out to the start of the ocean basins 
at the 200 meter depth is merely the sea ward or underwater part of the 
total continental shelf plain. As one geologist has stated: 
"The inland upper edge of this plain, an elevation of about 
600 feet above sea-level, marks the mean level of the land-
and-water surface of the globe; its lower edge, at an eleva-
tion of about 600 feet below sea-level marks the brink of the 
steep continental slope, which descends into the deep oceanic 
basins proper. Its outer edge also marks the depth limit of 
effective wave ~and current action on the sea floor and the 
limit to which sunlight is able to penetrate below the surface 
of marine waters." 32 
We need not concern ourselves here with the various theories ad-
vanced by scientists relative to the origin of the continental shelves.33 
It is essential, however, to any intelligent discussion of the merits of 
various legal theories which have been advanced to justify the claims 
by states to the resources of their shelves to remember that geolog-
ically the continental shelves are as much a part of their respective 
continents as are the dry land areas. Therefore, from a geological 
standpoint, it is not a question of whether the continental shelves are 
important countries, which have so much to contribute > to the orderly develop-
ment of the law of the sea, have now tacitly withdrawn their exclusive claims 
in the larger interest of the maximum inclusive use of the high seas. This hope 
is expressed despite the joint declaration by the chairmen of the delegations of 
Chile, Ecuador, and Peru during the closing days of the conference, reaffirming 
their extensive claims to high seas fisheries: "The reasons which, in recent 
years, have led Chile, Ecuador, and Peru to enact certain legislative provisions 
and to enter into certain agreements-to which Costa Rica has become a party-
still remain valid." U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 50. 
32 Pratt, op. cit., footnote 27 (note 6-5 at 658) Bourcart also relates the con-
tinental shelf and the coastal plains. Bourcart, op. cit., footnote 19 (note 5-1 at 
155-160). 
33 For summary statements of the origin of the continental shelves, see Prep. 
Doc. 2, pp. 8-10; Umbgrove, "Origin of the Continental Shelves," 30 Bulletin 
of American Association of Petroleum Geologists, 249-253 ( 1946) ; The conti-
nental shelves have been built up essentially in the following ways: (1) Sedi-
mentation; (2) Erosion, the cutting by waves of land areas and coastal terraces 
during times of lowered sea level caused by glaciers on - the continents; (3) 
Glacial action; ( 4) Bulging of the continent and concomitant downwarping of 
the submerged part; (5) Blockfaulting and folding, of which the most typical 
example is found along the southern coast of California. 
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contiguous (i.e., near to the continents), as has been suggested,34 but 
rather that they are in :fact an integral part o:£ the continents. Geo-
logically, the question is not one o:£ contiguity but o:£ continuity.85 
2. The Problem of Irregularities in the Shelf 
Although the above geological description o:£ the continental shelves 
is the predominant one, subject to the refinements and special distinc-
tions by some scientists which have been noted, not all shelves :follow 
the broad general pattern, a :fact which has been o:£ grave concern to 
international lawyers and particularly to the International Law Com-
mission in its deliberations.36 
The first problem arises :from the extreme variation in the widths 
of the various shelves. The average width :for shelves of the entire 
world is approximately 30 miles, but the range is from zero to more 
than 800 miles.37 This geological fact has prompted some states with 
little or no continental shelves to make extensive claims to the re-
sources of the high seas adjacent to their coasts to "compensate" :for 
the lack o:£ shelves. 
The second problem results from the :fact that the depth of the edge 
o:£ the continental shelf, although generally conforming to the 200 
meter or 100 :fathom line, actually varies :from less than 100 meters to 
more than 400 meters, even though the unevenness in configuration is 
generally not more than 100 meters except in glaciated areas.38 The 
problem facing the International Law Commission and the Geneva 
Conference was whether to use an arbitrary figure of 200 meters or 
some other figure as the depth o:£ superjacent waters to delimit the 
outer edge of the shelf,39 even though any such arbitrary figure would 
34 U.N. Doc. A/2456, 14, par. 73 (1953); U.N. Doc. A/3159, 43, par. 8 (1956). 
35 Sir Hersch Lauterpacht uses the terms contiguity and continuity interchange-
ably in support of the view that contiguity is the valid legal basis for unilateral 
claims by states of sovereignty over adjacent submarine areas, and he criticizes 
attempts to distinguish between them. 27 B.Y.I.L. 423 (1950). 
36 
See reports of the International Law Commission. U.N. Docs. A/1858 
( 1951), A/2456 ( 1953) , A/3159 ( 1956) . 
31 
Sverdrup et al., op. cit., footnote 19. Also see Carsey, "Geology of Gulf 
Coastal Area and Continental Shelf," 34 Bulletin of American Association of 
Petroleum Geologists, 361-385 ( 1950) ; Kuenen, op. cit., footnote 19 (at 105). 
38 
The Association of Physical Oceanography agreed upon the following defini-
tion: "Continental Shelf, Shelf Edge ... The zone around the continent, ex-
tending from the low-water line to the depth at which there is a marked increase 
of slope to greater depth. Conventionally its edge is taken at 100 fathoms (or 
200 metres) but instances are known where the increase of slope occurs at more 
_ than 200 or less than 65 fathoms ... " Also see Prep. Doc. 2, p. 13. 
30 
Several proposals were defeated which would have substituted the following 
criteria: 200 meters depth but not beyond 100 miles from the outer lin1it of the 
territorial sea (Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/C. 4/1.12) ; 550 meters 
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often not conform to geological facts, or whether to use some other 
criterion, or a combination of criteria. The Geneva Convention on the 
Continental Shelf adopted a combination of criteria, defining the 
continental shelf in terms of a 200 meter depth, or "beyond that limit, 
to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploita-
tion of the national resources of the said areas .... " 40 This delimi-
tation of the shelf may be described as both fiwed and flexible. It is 
fixed at the 200 meter depth until such time as science and technology 
make possible exploitation beyond the 200 meter ·depth limit, a:fter 
which it will become highly flexible and subject to constant change as 
technology advances.41 
Finally, in addition to the legal problems arising from varying 
widths of the continental shelves and the varying depths of the outer 
edge, the International Law Commission and the Geneva Conference 
struggled 'vith the problems which arise from the uneven configuration 
of the shelves. Within the continental shelves themselves scientists 
have found great bas1ns with depths in excess of 200 meters, as well as 
plateaus covered by shallow water, making for hundreds of irregular-
ities from the common concept of the continental shelves.42 Three 
categories of depressions have been distinguished: 43 
(a) First are depressions that connect with the deep sea beyond 
the outer edge of the shelf but over a sill at the level, or nearly at the 
level of the shelf floor. A good example of this type is the longitudinal 
trough along the coast of Norway which in effect splits the continental 
shelf into an inner and outer part. The problem, of course, is whether 
the outer part (i.e., the sill) is to be considered a part of the total 
continental shelf of the coastal state. 
(b) Second are depressions or broad, fiat troughs below the 200 
meter depth which do not have a sill in the outer part. T·hese types 
predominate off glaciated coasts such as the Cabot Strait Trough, 
south of N evvfoundland. 
(c) Third are the narrow canyon-like depressions which traverse 
the outer edge of the continental shelf, sloping out to the deep-sea 
floor. 
(Netherlands, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/C. 4/L. 19) ; and (United Kingdom, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF. 13/C. 4/L. 24/Rev. 1); 1,000 meters (India, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 
13/C. 4/L. 29), later revised to 550 meters of superjacent waters (U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF. 13/C. 4/L. 29/Rev. 1) ; shelf edg.e or 200 meters (Canada, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF. 13/C. 4/L. 30). Also see Whiteman, op. cit., footnote 12 (at 629, 634). 
40 Article 1. 
41 For a recent criticism of this ~twofold definition of the continental shelf, 
see Young, op. cit., footnote 12 (at 733, 735). 
42 Kuenen, op. cit., footnote 19 (at 154, 485 et seq) ; Uinbgrove, op. cit., footnote 
19 (at 120). 
43 Prep. Doc. 2, p. 14 and Annex thereto, p. 7. 
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The problem which arises in situations (b) aiLd (c) above is 
'vhether to include the troughs and depressions as part of the shelves, 
and if so, how to delimit the claims. The suggestion of adapting the 
straight baseline method of measuring territorial waters to the de-
limiting of the deep submarine shelf indentations "rill not likely 
meet with much approval.44 Nor is such a method necessary in view 
of the depth-of-exploitability criterion for determining the extent 
of the continental shelf beyond the 200 meter depth. 
3. Legal Definitions of the Continental Shelf 
In general the legal definitions of the continental shelf have relied 
upon the common geological concept of the shelf as the gentle-sloping, 
submarine extension of the continent into the sea, the outer edge 
of which is at a depth of some 100 fathoms or approximately 200 
meters, beyond which the shelf or platform begins a rapid descent 
towards the ocean depths. 
In the Gidel Memorandum on The Regime of the High Seas, which 
the International Law Commission had before it at its second session 
in 1950, it was suggested that "it seems advisable for jurists to rely 
on the common concept of the continental shelf." 45 The memoran-
dum recounted the fact that the official press release which accom-
panied the United States (Truman) Proclamation of 1945 46 referred 
to the common definition of the shelf as delimited by the 100 fathom 
isobath. The virtues of wniformity, fiwity and certitude were em-
phasized in support of the 200 meter or 100 fathom depth limit.47 
Despite the insistence of several international lawyers and organ-
izations that the common concept of the 200 meter isobath be followed 
in describing and delimiting the continental shelf, others objected to 
such a precise delimitation and the claims of many states from 1945 
to 1950 were not so delimited.48 Partly for the reason that the Inter-
national Law Commission wished to define the continental shelf 
legally in terms broad enough to ~encompass most or all of the various 
claims which had been made, and more particularly because the Com-
mission found that "the varied use of the term by scientists is in itself 
an obstacle to the adoption of the geological concept as a basis for 
legal regulation of the problem," 49 the Commission departed from 
44 Ibid., at 16. 
45 U.N. Doc. A/ON. 4/32, 50 (1950). 
46 "Press Release, 28 Sept. 1945," 13 Department of State Bulletin 484 (1945). 
47 U.N. Doc. A/ON. 4/32, 50-51 (1950). Also see Feith, "Rights to the Sea 
Bed and Its Subsoil," Report o1 Conference of International Law Association, 
-126 (Copenhagen, 1950) . 
48 See Appendix K, Synoptical Table of . Claims, particularly the claims of 
Mexico, Argentina, Chile, and Peru. 
~9 U.N. Doc. A/1858, 17 ( 1951) . 
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the geological concept in its 1951 draft articles by defining the con-
tinental shelf as the submarine areas outside of territorial waters 
"where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the ewploitation 
of the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil." 50 This may be 
referred to as the depth-of-exploitability definition. 
Three things are noteworthy about this 1951 legal definition: (1) 
First, is the absence of any depth limit for the outer edge of the 
continental shelf; ( 2) second, is the reference to t~1e continental shelf 
as being the submarine area outside the area of territorial waters; and 
( 3) third, is the use both of the term "continental shelf" and "sub-
marine area." Comments on each of these three aspects of the first 
definition by the International Law Commission are necessary for a 
clarification of some of the subsequent problems which have arisep. 
The ·Commission explained its preference for the depth -of-
exploitability test for defining the continental shelf, in preference to a 
fixed limit of superjacent waters, such as 200 meters, by saying that 
the fixed limit "would have the disadvantage· of instability" because 
"technical developments in the near future might make it possible 
to exploit resources of the sea bed at a depth of over 200 meters." 51 
With respect to the second aspect of the definition in the 1951 
draft articles, namely, that the continental shelf is the submarine 
area outside the area of territorial waters, this is indeed contrary to 
the geological-definition. According to this legal definition, the con-
tinental shelf does not begin at the shoreline of the dry-land mass, 
but begins at a point from three to twelve miles out from the shore-
line, depending upon which width the coastal state has claimed as 
defining the limits of its territorial waters. Under this legal defini-
tion the continental shelf becomes a sort of submerged ring around 
the continent or island, attached to the submarine area under the 
territorial sea, which in turn is attached to or forms an outward 
extension of the continent or island. 
Clearly this aspect of the legal definition does not conform to sci-
entific fact. Geologically the submarine area under the territorial 
sea, whatever its width, is as much a part of the continental shelf 
as is the submarine area beyond the territorial sea. However, the 
Commission justified its exclusion of the submarine areas under the 
territorial sea from the definition of the continental shelf by reiterat-
ing the long-established law of territorial waters,52 saying that the 
60 Ibid., Art. 1 of 1951 Draft Articles on the Continental Shelf and Related 
Subjects. (Emphasis added.) 
61 U.N. Doc. A/2456, 12 (1953). 
52 See . generally, Jessup, The Law of Territorial Waters and Maritime Juris-
diction (1927) ; Fulton, The Sovereignty of the Sea (1911) ; Crocker, Extent of 
the Marginal Sea (1919) ; Riesenfeld, Protection of Coastal Fisheries under 
International Law (1942). 
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"submarine areas beneath territorial waters are, like the waters above 
them, subject to the sovereignty of the coastal State." 53 
Thus the Commission was differentiating in effect, though not in 
the geological sense, between an "inner" and an "outer" shelf ; meaning 
by the inner shelf only that part of the total continental shelf (ge-
ologically defined) which is under the territorial sea, and meaning by 
the outer shelf only that part of the total shelf which is outside of 
the territorial sea. This designation of the continental shelf as the 
submarine area outside of territorial waters, whatever their width, 
\Vas continued by the Commission in its subsequent draft articles of 
1953 and 1956 and is now a part of the Geneva Convention on the 
Continental Shelf. 54 
This "legal" distinction between inner and outer portions of the 
continental shelf was made by President Ttuman in his famous 
proclamation of 28 September 1945,55 in which the United States 
claimed the natural resources of the subsoil and seabed of the conti-
nental shelf beneath the high seas-i.e., outside of territorial waters. 56 
Subsequently, the Congress of the United States, in resolving the 
dispute between the federal government and the individual coastal 
states in favor of the states, following the United States Supreme 
Court decisions which held for the federal government against 
California,57 Texas,58 and Louisiana,59 clearly distinguished in two 
different acts between the inner and outer portions of the total conti-
nental shelf as defined geologically. The first of these acts is known 
as the Submerged Lands Act,60 approved May 22, 1953; the other is 
entitled the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act,61 which became law 
53 U.N. Doc. A/1858, 18, Comment 9 (1951). 
5
' See Appendix D. 
55 59 Stat. 884 (1945) ; 10 Federal Register, 12303 (1945) ; 13 Department of 
State Bulletin, 485 (1945). 
56 The distinction was also emphasized in the State Department press release 
of the same date which explained the Truman Proclamation in part as follows: 
"The rapid development of technical knowledge and equipment occasioned by 
the war now makes possible the determination of the resources of the submerged 
lands outside of the three-mile limit. With the need for the discovery of addi-
tional resources of petroleum and other minerals, it became advisable for the 
United States to make possible orderly development of these resources. The 
proclamation of the President is designed to serve this purpose." 12 Department 
of State Bulletin, 484 (1945). . 
57 United States V .. California, 332 U.S.19 (1947). 
58 United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950). 
59 United States v~Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950). 
60 43 U.S.C.A. pars. 1301-1303, 1311-1315; 67 Stat. 29, May 22, 1953. 
_ 
61 43 U.S.C.A. 1331-1343 (Ch. 345-Pub. Law 212), 67 -Stat. 462 (T. 34, par. 
524; T. 43, par. 1331 note, 1331-43, Aug. 7, 1953). Continental Shelf-Reserving 
and placing certain resources under jurisdiction of Secretary of Interior, 5 par. 
485 note. Executive Order No. 9633. 
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on August 7, 1953. Section 2 of the latter act defines "outer continental 
shelf" as "all submerged lands lying sea ward and outside of the area 
of lands beneath navigable waters as defined in Section 2 of the 
Submerged Lands Act. . . ." (i.e., all submerged lands outside of 
the three mile limit on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts and outside the 
three-league limit in the Gulf of Mexico.). 
The third aspect of the 1951 definition of the continental shelf by 
the International Law Commission which is worthy of comment is the 
use in the definition both of the term "continental shelf" and "sub-
marine area." Because the accidents of geography in the world have 
resulted in the generous endowment of some countries with broad 
continental shelves while at the same time depriving other countries 
of such shelves, and because the term "continental shelf"· is not accu-
rate, geologically speaking, when applied to certain submarine areas 
of the world such as those in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Paria 
where the depth of the superjacent waters never reaches 200 meters, 
or when applied to insular shelves, the International Law Commission 
seriously considered the possibility of adopting a term other than 
"continental shelf." 
Terms suggested were "submarine platform" 62 and "submarine 
area," 63 the latter having been used in the British-Venezuela T·reaty 
relative to the Gulf of Paria 64 and in the British Order-in-Council 
following the treaty. 65 The Commission finally decided to use the 
term "continental shelf," giving as its reason, "because it is in current 
use and because the term 'submarine areas' used alone would give no 
indication of the nature of the submarine areas in question." 66 It is 
submitted that the 1951 definition by the International Law Commis-
sion in Article 1 was right in boldly using the term "continental 
shelf" despite the fact that it was then a relatively new term in 
international law. Now, of course, the term is accepted parlance in 
62 U.N. Doc. A/CN. 68, p. 4. 
63 Young, "Legal Status of Submarine Areas Beneath The High Seas," 45 
A.J.I.L. 227 (1951). Several states indicated their dissatisfaction with the 
term "continental shelf" and suggested a preference for the term "submarine 
areas." See Comments by Governments on Draft Articles on the Continental 
Shelf and Related Subjects, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/55 (1952). Also see Francois, 
"Report on the Regime of the High Seas," U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/60; U.N. Doc. 
A/2456, Annex II, 42-72 (1953). See particularly the comments of Belgium 
(Ibid., at 42) ; Israel (Ibid., at 59) ; .and Sweden (Ibid., at 65). It is interesting 
to note that Mouton entitled his excellent book The Continental Shelf, but 
objected to the use of the term, preferring instead the term "shelf" without 
the adjective "continental." Mouton, Tlhe Continental Shelf, at 45 (1952). 
64 Great Britain Treaty Series #10 (191:2). 
65 Order-in-Council, Aug. 6, 1942, Submarine areas of the Gulf of Paria (annex-
ation). 
66 U.N. Doc. A/1858, 17, Comment 3 (1951.). 
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international law circles, notwithstanding the fact that the legal 
definition as embodied in the Geneva Convention is at variance in 
several respects with the scientific definition. 
In addition to the controversy among governments and legal scholars 
over the depth-of-exploitability definition of the continental shelf 
versus a fixed depth limit of 200 meters or some other depth, it is 
interesting to note another variation which was suggested, because 
it underlies the unjustified claims of certain Latin American countries 
to sovereignty over a 200-mile wide belt of high seas. Yugoslavia 
favored not only a depth limit of 200 meters, but also a combination 
of this limit with one of width, expressing approval of Mr. El Khouri's 
(Syria) proposal of a "minimum boundary 'X' miles from the coast, 
regardless of the depth, and a maximum boundary 'X' meters of depth 
regardless of the distance from the coast" 67 in order to avoid mis-
understandings among neighboring countries. 68 
The Yugoslav Government was fearful that unless each country 
was given a minimum continental shelf in terms of distance from the 
shore, a country with advanced technology could, particularly in the 
case of a common continental shelf, extend its claims in terms of its 
technology. Hence, the Yugoslav Government argued, a country with 
the most advanced technology could claim vast areas of the deep ocean 
basins whereas other countries might be limited, because of inadequate 
technology, to extremely shallow waters. 
It seems clear that the Yugoslav Government's interpretation of 
the Commission's language in Article 1, "where the depth of the super-
jacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of 
the sea-bed and subsoil," was erroneous. This depth which admits of 
exploitation should be interpreted absolutely in terms of the most 
advanced technology in the world, and not relatively in terms of the 
particular technology of any one coastal state. 69 
The whole problem of defining the continental shelf in terms of 
67 U.N. Doc. A/ON. 4/SR. 113, 18-19. This proposal was defeated by a substan-
tial (7-1) vote in the Commission. (Ibid., at 23.) 
68 U.N. Doc. A/2456, p. 71 (1953). 
69 In support of this position see Mouton, op. cit., footnote 63 (at 42) ; and 
U.N. Doc. A/ON. 4/60, 102. Young makes an interesting suggestion for keeping 
all nations informed of the latest developments in exploitability of the conti-
nental shelf: ". . . [I] t might be possible for each party to file periodically 
with the Secretary ' General of the United Nations a statement indicating the 
maximum depth at which it was exploiting the resources of its shelf. The 
greatest such figure~ established to the satisfaction of the Secretary General, 
would determine the outer shelf limits for all parties untU the next succeeding 
report." Young, "The Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf: A First 
Impression." 52 A.J.I.L. 733, 735 (1958). 
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width was discussed at length by the International Law Commission, 70 
particularly in terms of a minimum distance from the coast or from 
the outer limit of territorial waters. Two considerations motivated 
this discussion : ( 1) an awareness of the fact that certain Latin Amer-
ican countries had framed their proclamations in terms of distance 
from their coasts, each claiming 200 nautical miles, regardless of 
the existence of any continental shelf in the geological sense, 71 and 
(2) the apparent need to make some sort of concession to those coun-
tries which opposed the definition in terms of the 200 meter depth 
limit because such a definition, without some provision for the coastal 
states which had only limited continental shelves, would sharply 
circumscribe their claims. 
Despite the many arguments against defining the continental shelf -
in terms of width, the Commission by the narrow margin of six to 
five originally voted a concession to the states without continental 
shelves by adopting a proposal which read, 
"The rights of control and jurisdiction referred to in the 
present chapter belong, up to a distance of twenty miles be-
yond territorial waters, to all the coastal States which do not 
possess a continental shelf as defined in article 1." 72 
Finally, however, because of the sharp criticism by the minority, 
the Commission in 1951 adopted Article 1 without any reference to 
width in defining the continental shelf,73 a policy which was followed 
in the 1953 and 1956 draft articles and in the Geneva Convention on 
the Continental Shelf. 
Several conclusions emerge from the various discussions in the Inter-
national Law Commission, the Geneva Conference, and among legal 
scholars, relative to defining the continental shelf in terms of an arbi-
trary width. First, since the widths of the shelves vary so greatly, 
70 U.N. Docs. A/CN. 4/SR. 66, 26; A/CN. 4/SR. 113, 18-19; A/CN. 4/SR. 117, 
10, 19. In the third session of the Commission, Mr. Yepes (Colombia) proposed, 
"The rights of control and jurisdiction referred to in the present chapter belong, 
up to a distance of twenty miles beyond the coast, to all Coastal States, even 
if they do not possess a continental shelf in the geological sense." (Ibid., at 10). 
A committee of the International Law Association also argued for a minimum 
breadth of 20 miles from the coast. U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/SR. 66, 26. 
71 For citations regarding the claims of Chile, Ecuador, and Peru to a maritime 
zone of 200 miles for exclusive exploitation of fisheries, and related develop-
ments, see MacChesney, U.S. Naval War College International Law Situation 
and Documents, 1956, 264-294, 448, 455, 486 (1957). Costa Rica also followed 
the lead of Chile in claiming 200 miles of continental shelf, including sovereignty 
over the superjacent waters. U.N. Leg. Series 9, p. 9 (1951L Also see Mac-
Chesney, op. cit., 451. 
72 U.N. Doc. A/ON. 4/SR.117, 15. 
73 U.N. Doc. A/1858, 17 (1951). 
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at least when the 200-meter depth lin1it is used either as the geological 
or legal norm to 1nark the outer edge of the shelf, an arbitrary width 
criterion is totally unrelated to the norm and hence impracticable. 
Second, any attempt to grant all coastal states a minimum continental 
shelf in terms of distance from the shore, or from the outer limits 
of the territorial sea, in order to "compensate" those states which have 
only extremely narrow continental shelves, is completely illogical. 74 
Third, suggestions to grant a minimum breadth of continental shelf 
in order to permit the coastal state to explore and exploit the resources 
of the submarine subsoil from the mainland is unnecessary because 
states may now exploit those resources without legal limitation. Such 
exploitation is circumscribed only by the limitations of science and 
technology. If the tunnels and other devices for exploiting such 
resources originate on the continent (or island), interference with 
either navigation or fishing is not likely to occur and hence such 
exploitation is completely outside the continental shelf problem. 
Finally, when the continental shelf is defined in terms of depth-of-
exploitability, as well .as in terms o:f the 200-meter depth limit for the 
outer edge, as was done in the Geneva Convention, there is no need 
to make any provision for a minimum or maximum width of the shelf 
area. Under the depth-of-exploitability definition the maximum 
'vidth of the shelf capable of exploitation will continue to increase 
as tlie world's technology for exploiting the submarine areas im-
proves, whether those areas are -what the geologists describe as the 
"continental shelf'' or the deeper, more steeply inclined areas known 
as the "continental slopes." For coastal states facing the open oceans 
the only real limitation to exploitation will be that of technology. 
For states with common shelves-i.e., states whose coasts are oppo-
site each other, or adjacent-the area of exploitability for each state 
will be determined and delimited either by agreement or by an equi-
table .allocation of the submarine areas to the respective claimants 
as provided for in the Geneva Convention. 75 
When the Commission's 1951 depth-of-exploitability definition, al-
74 A good summary of the absurdity of the "compensation" theory was that 
made by the International Bar Association in London: "This leads to a question 
of justicia distributiva. It may be bard on Switzerland that it bas no sea coast 
to base a fishing industry upon, as well as it may be bard on Holland that it bas 
no Alps to boost its ~tourist trade; do the lack of such natural assets in itself 
justify the consideration of compensatory measures .... " Report of the Oom-
rnit t ee on Coastal Waters ana Appurtenant Su bsoil, Third International Confer-
ence of the Legal Profession, International Bar Association (London, 8 July 
1950). -
75 See the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, Articles 6 and 7, Ap-
pendix D. 
607631- 61- -3 
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ready excoriated by several of the members of the Commission, 76 "\vas 
sent out to various governments for comments, it was further criti-
cized.77 In addition, a number of legal scholars also found fault with 
the Commission's 1951 depth-of-exploitability definition. Mouton, 
referring with favor to the reason given by the United Nations Secre-
tariat in its 1950 "Men1orandum on the Regime of the High Seas,'> 
argued that a fixed depth limit "possesses the characteristics of uni-
formity, fixity and certitude required for legal transactions." 78 Like 
Mouton, Waldock felt that the 1951 definition by ·the Commission in 
terms of exploitability was too vague and lacked the advantages of a 
delimitation of this "new right" by a fixed depth limit. - He said, 
"This definition is extremely vague, being open to subjec-
tive interpretations by the coastal States which might result 
in very large claims." 79 
The United States, on the other hand, found no serious fault with 
the 1951 depth-of-exploitability definition, expressing "general agree-
ment with the principles which appear to inspire the draft articles." 80 
However, in view of the many criticisms by various governments 
and writers of the 1951 depth-of-exploitability definition of the con-
tinental shelf, Mr. Francois, in his fourth report on the regin1e of 
76 Perhaps the strongest critic on the Commission of the whole concept of the 
continental shelf was Georges Scelle (France) who considered it a legal fiction. 
(U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/SR. 117, 19) His two main objections to the continental 
shelf doctrine were : ( 1) the uncertainty of what is included in the so-called 
continental shelf since, geologically there are often several submarine platforms 
or pedestals, and (2) any rights of a coastal state over submarine areas con-
tiguous to its shore should be limited to the possibility of its actual exploitability 
which is now not over 30 to 40 meters (90 to 120 feet). Since the future is sub-
ject to so much scientific speculation, a precise legal norm must be developed in 
terms of the technical and financial possibilities of a state to explore and exploit 
the continental shelf. Scene, "Le Plateau Continental," Revue Generale de 
Droit International362, (1955). 
77 Comments by Governments on Draft Articles on the Continental Shelf and 
Related Subjects. U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/55 (May 1952). Also see Francois, 
"Fourth Report on the Regime of the High Seas." U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/60; U.N. 
Doc. A/2456 Annex II, 42-72 (1953). 
78 Mouton, op. cit., footnote 63 (at 43) . 
79 U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/60, 23. Also see Report of the Forty-Fifth Conference of 
the International Law Association, Lucerne, 148 (1952). 
80 U.N. Doc. A/2456, Annex II, 70 (1953). The only United States comment 
with respect to Article 1 of the 1951 draft articles was to suggest "whether it 
would not be advisable to make it clear, at least in the commentaries, that control 
and jurisdiction for the purpose indicated in the draft articles mean in fact an 
exclusive, but functional, right to explore and exploit." (Ibid. This U.S. claim 
to an exclusive right was vigorously opposed by Colban at the 1952 meeting of the 
International Law Association. See Report of the Forty-Fifth Conference of 
the International Law Associatidn, Lucerne, 150 (1952).) 
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the high seas, proposed the adoption of a 200 meter depth limit, 81 
explaining that the criterion of exploitability had been widely criti-
cized "for not laying down a fixed limit, and the view had been ex-
pressed that a depth of 200 metres should be adopted." 82 
Mr. Francois' fourth report, together with the comments by the 
various governments on the 1951 provisional draft articles, were care-
fully analyzed by the Commission at its 1953 sessions in Geneva. 
Despite some vigorous dissents to the effect that the Commission 
should not reverse its earlier (1951) decision and revert to a geological 
definition 83 because the criterion of exploitability was "more flexible, 
and should be maintained," 84 and because "if a geological definition 
was now adopted, states like Chile and Peru, which had no continental 
shelf in the geological sense of the word, would be placed at a serious 
disadvantage," 85 and also because the "possibility of exploiting nat-
ural resources at a depth greater than 200 metres must be envisaged," 86 
the Commission yielded to the criticisms of its 1951 definition and 
adopted the 200 meter depth limit. 
Thus the Commission had returned to the common geological con-
cept of the continental shelf with a fixed depth for the superjacent 
waters as marking the outer edge of the shelf. Supporting the 200 
rneter depth limit in preference to the depth-of-exploitability defini-
tion, Mr. Lauterpacht (later Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, a judge on the 
International Court of Justice), said, 
" ... an exact limit has the merit of clarity, which is ex-
tremely desirable, since in matters pertaining to the continen-
tal shelf some governments are inclined in addition to 
legitimate assertion of right, to make others." 87 
He made critical reference to the extensive claims which had been 
made by certain South American countries to sovereignty over re-
sources of the high seas, saying, "this association of the assumption 
of title over submarine areas with sweeping claims to sovereignty over 
the high seas is mischievous in its results and must therefore be a 
cause for regret." 88 
81 U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/60, 103, 123. 
82 U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/SR.195, 17. 
83 Ibid. 
84 U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/SR.196, 6. 
85 U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/SR.195, 18. 
86 U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/SR. 196, 3. 
87 U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/SR. 196, 6. 
88 Lauterpacht, "Sovereignty Over Submarine Areas," 27 B.Y.I.L. 413-414 
(1950). 
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At its eighth session in 1956 the Commission adopted a definition 
which co1nbined the 200 meter depth limit with the 1951 depth-of-
exploitability criterion, saying, 
". . . the term 'continental shelf' is used as referring to the 
seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the 
coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 
200 metres (approximately 100 :fathoms), or, beyond that 
limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits 
of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said 
areas." 89 
This is the definition which was adopted by the Geneva Conference 
'vith only two slight modifications.90 The first modific~tion was the 
elimination of the parenthetical expression "approximately 100 
fathoms." The second was the addition of a sub-section, based upon a 
proposal by the Philippines,91 which provides that "continental shelf" 
also includes "insular shelf." 92 
A careful analysis of the n1any discussions in the I.nternational Law 
Commission sessions of 1951, 1953 and 1956, and of the discussions in 
Committee IV and the plenary meetings of the Geneva Conference, 
suggests that the final definition of the continental shelf which was 
cast both in terms of a fixed outer limit (i.e., 200 meter depth of super-
jacent waters) and a flewible outer limit ( depth-of-exploitability even 
beyond a 200 meter depth) is an understandable compromise between 
divergent views in order to arrive at a definition which would be ac-
ceptable to a majority of states and yet recognize the views of the 
minority states, many of which are located in areas of the world 
89 U.N. Doc. A/3159, Art. 67, 41 (1956). 
00 U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 55, Art. 1. The I.L.C. text, as amended was ap-
proved in Committee IV of the Conference by a vote of 51 in favor, 9 votes 
against, \Vith 10 abstentions (A/CONF. 13/C. 4/SR. 19, 4-5 (25 March 1958)). 
91 U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/C. 4/L. 26. The Philippine proposal was as follows: 
"All references in these articles to 'continental shelf' shall be understood to 
apply also to similar submarine areas adjacent to and surrounding the coasts 
of islands." It was adopte~d in Committee IV by a vote of 31 in favor (U.S. 
included) 10 against, with 25 abstentions (U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/C. 4/SR. 19, 
4 (25 Thiarch 1958)). 
92 Actually, this addition to Article 1 of the Geneva Convention does nothing, 
more than to formalize, as part of an article, what was formerly contained in 
the I.L.C. commentaries to its draft articles. In this case, comme~tary 10 to 
I.L.C. draft article 67 ( 19156) read, "The term 'continental shelf' does not imply 
that it refers exclusively to continents· in the current connotation of that word. 
It also covers the submarine areas contiguous to islands." (U.N. Doc. A/3159, 
42 (1956)). 
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where the geological formations do not conform to the usual pattern 
of the continental shelf.93 
By stating the 200 meter depth limit first in the definition and em-
phasizing it, both the International Law Commission's 1956 articles 
and the Geneva Convention stress the fact that the legal definition is 
based predominantly upon the scientific definition of the continental 
shelf. Moreover, the 200 meter depth limit has the advantage of being 
precise and certain, and is probably quite adequate for the next decade 
or more in view of the present state of offshore exploitation technology 
and the anticipated developments thereof.94 
Then, by adding the alternative criterion o£ exploitability even 
beyond the 200 meter depth of superjacent waters, the Commission's 
articles and the Geneva Convention wisely took cognizance of several 
facts. First is the scientific fact, as explained previously, that the 
outer edge of the shelf is often found at depths considerably in excess 
of 200 meters, even though this figure is a good working average. 
Hence, by using the alternative depth-of-exploitability criterion, a 
coastal state is not deprived "arbitrarily of so obvious a part of its 
continental shelf." 95 Second, is the fact that a coastal state not only 
has sovereign rights over its continental shelf but, as advancing off-
shore technology permits it to exploit the resources out to the 200 
meter edge of the shelf and beyond that into the greater depths of 
the continental slope, it also has sovereign rights beyond the geologi-
93 In its commentaries to the 1956 articles the I.L.C. " ... noted that the 
Inter-American Specialized Conference on 'Conservations of Natural Resources: 
Continental Shelf and Oceanic 'Vaters,' held at Ciudad Trujillo (Dominican 
Republic) in March 1956, had arrived at the conclusion that the right of the 
coastal State should be extended beyond the limit of 200 metres, 'to where the 
depth of the superjacent waters .admits of the exploitation of the natural re-
sources of the seabed and subsoil'." (U.N. Doc. A/3159, 41 (1956) .) 
94 Oil drilling in the continental shelf from fixed installations is currently pos-
sible in about 55 meters (180 feet) of water. In the opinion of several scien-
tists, it is expected that technological developments within the next ten years 
will permit the design of structures to facilitate the drilling of wells in water 
depths of 500 feet ( 152.5 meters) or greater and that oil exploitation is con-
sidered possible in a 200-meter water depth but with a different type of struc-
ture than is now being used. See "Recent Developments in the Technology of 
Exploiting the Mineral Resources of the Continental Shelf," U.N. Preparatory 
Document No. 20, '(A/CONF. 13/25 (1958)). 
95 Young, "The Legal Status of Submarine Areas Beneath the High Seas," 45 
A.J.I.L. 235 (1951). Young approves the suggestion in the "Report of the Com-
mittee on Rights to the Sea Bed and its Subsoil," Report of Conference of Inter-
national Law Association 15 (Copenhagen, 1950). 
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cal edge of the shelf,96 delimited only by technological developments 
and by the median line which separates common continental shelves 
of states opposite, or adjacent to, each other. Third, is the fact that 
the continental shelf is an integral part of the continent (or island) 
and that the coastal state is best able to exploit the resources of its 
continental shelf, broadly defined, whatever the depth of the super-
jacent waters, in the interest of maximum developm.ent and utilization 
of the sea bed and subsoil resources for the benefit of all mankind. 
C. CLAIMS TO THE CONTINENTAL SHELF RESOURCES 
1. Early Claims to Sea Bed and Subsoil Resources 
Despite the fact that one may not be sure exactly how many cen-
turies ago the first claims were made to some of the resources of what 
we now call the sea bed of the continental shelf, one may infer that 
it was ,at least as early as the sixth century B.C.97 
In modern times one of the first legislative acts claiming exclusive 
control over the sea bed resources (i.e., sedentary fisheries) was the 
British Colonial Act of 1811 which asserted dominion over the Ceylon 
pearl banks far beyond the three mile limit.98 It authorized the 
seizure and condemnation of any boat found within the limits of the 
pear 1 banks or hovering near them and the anchoring of vessels in 
the vicinity was also regulated. At later dates similar additional 
regulations were issued by the British Colonial Office.99 
Legislative action was also taken by Australia on several occasions 
from 1881 to 1898 for the protection and regulation of the sedentary 
00 In its commentaries to the 1956 articles, the I.L.C. said, "While adopting, to 
a certain extent, the geographical test for the 'continental shelf' as the basis of 
the juridical definition of· the term, the Commission therefore in no way holds 
that the existence of a continental shelf, in the geographical sense as generally 
understood, is essential for the ex·ercise of the rights of the coastal State as 
defined in these articles ... exploitation of a submarine area at a depth exceed-
ing 200 metres is not contrary to the present rules, .merely because the area is 
not a continental shelf in the geological sense." U.N. Doc. A/3159, 41 (1956). 
97 Jessup, The Law of Territorial Waters and JJ!aritime Jurisdiction 15 (1927). 
Also see the interesting and much-cited article, Hurst, Whose Is the Bed of the 
Sea?, B.Y.I.L. (1923-24), at 34. On p. 37 he says: " ... [t]he rights of the 
Crown in the bed of the sea must have been fixed at least as early as the thir--
teenth century." 
98 Legislative Enactments, Ceylon, 1707-1879, Regulation No. 3 of 1811 for the 
protection of H.M. pearl banks of Ceylon. 
99 Thurston, Pearl and Ohank Fisheries (1894) ; Fulton, op. cit., footnote 52 
(at 697) ; Crocker, fJp. cit., footnote 52 (at 544). 
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fisheries in Western Australia.100 Whether this legislative action, and 
that taken with respect to sedentary fisheries off Queensland/01 
applied to the sea bed beyond territorial waters is in dispute. Accord-
ing to Riesenfeld/02 J essup/03 and others/04 it did operate to give the 
coastal state control of the sedentary fisheries over a wide area of the 
high seas well beyond territorial waters.105 
Other states have also regulated sea bed resources beyond terri-
torial "\Vaters (i.e., sedentary fisheries) for more than a century.106 
Ho,vever, one may conclude from an examination of the legislative 
acts and treaties, and from the few cases involving disputes over 
sedentary fisheries that the legal difficulties arising out of conflicting 
claims to sea bed resources beyond territorial waters have been infre-
quent and have been resolved rather easily.107 
The purpose of this brief resume is not to present an exhaustive list 
of all of the claims which have been made by states for several 
centuries, and particularly during the last century, to the sea bed 
resources of "\vhat we now refer to as the continental shelves. Rather, 
the purpose is to underscore the fact that for centuries man has been 
concerned to a modest extent-meaning ·within the limits of his 
100 The Pearl-shell and Beche-de-mer Fishery Act (1891), 45 Viet. No. 2, 
The Queensland Statutes, vol. 1, Brisbane, 1911. (Amended in 1886, 1891, 1893, 
1896 and 1898.) The act of 1886 is entitled Shark's Bay Pearl Shell Fishery 
Act, 50 Viet. No. 14. Sec. 8 provided in part as follows: "All pearls and pearl 
shells lying or contained within the limits of any licensed area shall, during 
the continuance of the license, be deemed to be the absolute property of the 
licensee for all purposes, civil or criminal ... ". See reference to the 1186 
Act in the Indian case of 1904 which found that a claimant had a property 
right in chanks on beds in the open sea based upon immemorial rights handed 
down from sovereign to sovereign. Annakumaru PiZZai v. MuthupayaZ, XXVII 
Indian Law Reports, Madras Series, 551, (1904). 
101 Pearl Shell and Beche-de-mer Fishery Acts, 1881-1931, cited in O'Connell, 
"Sedentary Fisheries and the Australian Continental Shelf," 49 A.J.I.L., 186 
(footnote 11) ( 1955) . 
102 Riesenfeld, op. cit., footnote 52 (at 170). 
103 .Jessup, op. cit., footnote 97 (at p.16). 
104 lVIouton, op. cit., footnote 63 (at 140) ; II Hackworth, Digest of Interna-
tional Law, 678 (1941). 
105 An Australian writer challenges the view that the clain1s are to sea bed 
resources of the high seas, contending that such view is based on a widely held 
misconception of ,what constitutes the maritime boundary of Queensland. 
O'Connell, op. cit., footnote 101 (at 187). It is admitted, however, that British 
ships and nationals operating on the high seas were regulated and that the 
Australian Navy had controlled the pearling activities of Dutch fishermen 
outside territorial limits. (Ibid.) See Goldie, 1 Sydney Law Review JJ5 (1953). 
106 Crocker, op. cit., footnote 52 (at 554) ; .Jessup, op. cit., footnote 97 (at 13) ; 
Fulton, op. cit., footnote 52 (at 619-G21). 
107 I Gidel, Le Droit International Public De LaMer, 489-491 (1932). 
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existing technology and consonant with his needs--with the exploita-
tion and control of so1ne of the resources of the sea bed, both within 
and without territorial waters. Further, it has been our purpose to 
emphasize the fact that historically states have generally recognized 
the priority of the coastal state to exclusive rights over the sedentary 
fisheries resources of the sea bed beyond the limit of territorial waters, 
particularly where there has been effective and continued use.108 Con-
tinued recognition of this priority of the coastal state to the sedentary 
fish on the continental shelf is articulated in the Geneva Convention 
on the Continental Shelf.109 
In contrast to the claims of states to the sea bed resources of the 
continental shelves which go back several' centuries, claims by states 
to the subsoil resources of the continental shelves are of fairly recent 
origin. The first such claim was made only a century ago. On 2 Au-
gust 1858, Royal Assent was given to an act in England called the 
Cornwall Submarine Mines Act, which declared that all mines and 
rninerals below low water mark under the ~pen sea, adjacent to, but 
not being part of the County of Cornwall, were, as between the 
Queen in right of Her Crown and the Duke of Cornwall, vested in 
the Queen "as part of the soil and territorial possessions of the 
Crown." 110 
This Act was the outgrowth of a dispute bet,veen the Crown and 
the Duchy of Cornwall as to the ownership of minerals derived from 
the mines beneath the water on the coast_ of Cornwall. The dispute, 
which was finally settled by arbitration in the case of Rex v. K eyn,111 
108 Fulton, op cit., footnote 52 (at 697) : "They (sedentary fisheries) may be 
very valuable, are generally restricted in extent, and are admittedly capable of 
being exhausted or destroyed ... and international law also recognizes in 
certain cases a claim to such fisheries when they extend along the soil under the 
sea beyond the ordinary territorial limit." Also see Hurst, op. cit., footnote 97 
(at 40-41) : "The pearl and chank fisheries in the Gulf of 1\rlanaar were claimed 
from early times by the successive Portuguese, Dutch and British masters of 
the neighbouring territory, and there can be little doubt but that a good title 
to the ownership of these beds can be made out, based on long-continued 
occupation." 
109 U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 55, Art. 2 ( 4) (1958). Art. 2 ( 4) provides: "The 
natural resources referred to in these articles consist of the mineral and other 
nonliving resources of the sea-bed and subsoil together with living organisms 
belonging to sedentary species, that is to say, organis111s which, at the harvest-
able stage, either are immobile on or under .the sea-bed or are unable to move 
except in constant physical contact with the sea-bed or the subsoil." 
110 The Cornwall Submarine Mine Act (1858) 21 and 22 Victoria Cap. CIX. 
Also see Norfolk Estuary Act ( 1846) and Lincoln Estuary Act ( 1851). 
111 L.R. 2 Exch. Div. 155-157,199-201. 
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culminated in a law which gave effect to the arbitral award.112 Since 
there is no indication in the Act of the outward limits of the 1nines 
belo\v lo·w water mark, one may infer that they could extend as far 
into the subsoil of the high seas as technology would permit. 
Other underseas mines, principally coal, which represented 19th 
century claims by states to subsoil resources of the continental shelves, 
although often not extending beyond the limit of territorial waters, 
\Vere those of Australia, Canada, Chile and Japan, as \vell as 1nany 
others in England besides the Corn wall mines.113 These clai1ns were 
based upon the recognized right of a coastal state to occupy the sub-
soil under the high seas by the extension of mining installations whose 
entrance was located on the coastal state or in the territorial waters 
thereof.114 
Were these 19th century claims to the submarine subsoil resources, 
and the earlier claims of states to resources of the sea bed (i.e., seden-
tary fisheries), precursors of the present day continental shelf proc-
lamations? It is submitted that they were,115 despite obvious dif-
ferences between the early claims to the resources of the sea bed and 
subsoil and those of the mid -twentieth century. These differences 
1nay be summarized briefly. 
(a) Differences in terrninology. The 19th century and anteced-
112 The arbitrator's award gives no reason for deciding that the minerals 
obtained from workings below low water mark belong to the Crown. The award 
merely says that they were vested in Her Majesty in right of Her Crown. When 
the Bill was prepared the draftsman added the words that these minerals were 
vested in Her Majesty in right of her Crown, "as part of the soil and territorial 
possessions of the Crown." Hurst suggests that these words may have been 
added by inadvertence or, what is more likely, that "the draftsman considered 
that the addition represented a necessary element in Sir John Patteson's award." 
Hurst, op. cit., footnote 97 (at 34). 
113 Gidel, op. cit., footnote 107 (at 510). Also see Brief for Texas, United States 
v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950). Opposite p. 5 is a drawing of a cross-section of 
the submarine coal mine of Lota, Chile, showing a mine extending four miles 
from shore under the Pacific Ocean. 
114 U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/17, 33; in addition to claiming the mineral resources of 
the continental shelf during the 19th Century, France and England have from 
time to time considered building a tunnel under the high seas. "Report of the 
Commissioners for the Channel Tunnel and Railway" (1876) (H.M. Stat. Office), 
C. 1576. _However, since the Channel Tunnel proposal was never for1nalized 
into a treaty, a pro.clamation, or legisl:.l_tion by either France or Great Britain, 
it is probably more accurate to say that specific claims by coastal states to the 
subsoil of their continental shelves during the 19th century were limited to 
underseas mines. 
115 The press release which accompanied the Truman Proclamation of ,1945 on 
the continental shelf (Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, 28 Sept. 1945, 59 
Stat. 884) made specific reference to the submarine ore mines of England, Chile 
and other countries. 
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ent claims did not use the term "continental shelf" because it had 
not yet been invented. By contrast, the 20th century claims generally 
use the term "continental shelf," although some have not done so. 
(b) Differences in interference with freedom of the seas. The 
19th century claims, and earlier ones, to the resources of the sea bed 
and the subsoil, generally speaking, did not interfere with the freedom 
of the seas because the exploitation methods used involved no installa-
tions in the high seas. Sedentary fisheries were harvested by ships 
and minerals were exploited via tunnels originating on the land-mass. 
Of course, laws such as the British Colonial Act of 1811, referred to 
earlier, did prevent other States :from harvesting sedentary fisheries 
and excluded their ships from the pearl banks. 
By contrast, however, the exploitation o.f the continental shelves 
today, mostly for oil, often requires the building of installations 
attached permanently to the sea bed and the subsoil of the shelf 
which project above the surface of the high seas and of necessity 
involve some interference with the unfettered use of the seas by 
other states :for navigation, fishing, cable and pipeline laying, scien-
tific research and other purposes. Because of this possible interfer-
ence by the coastal state through its exploitation of the continental 
shelf, with the free use of the seas by other states, the International 
Law Commission's draft articles and the Geneva Convention on the 
Continental Shelf contain provisions against such interference if it is 
unjustifiable.116 
(c) Differences in emtent of claims. The claims were modest a 
century or more ago because the knowledge of the sea bed resources 
and particularly of the subsoil resources was meager. Moreover, the 
technology available for their exploitation, as well as the needs of the 
states, were limited. By contrast, the claims in the mid-twentieth 
century .are great because the needs are great, and our knowledge and 
technology are far advanced, even though still considerably short o:f 
what is required to exploit the continental shelves at their outer edges 
where the depth of the superjacent waters is 200 meters or more.117 
116 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf (U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 55, 
Art. 3-5 (1958) ). Art. 4 provides that the exploitation of the continental shelf 
"must not result in any unjustifiable interference with navigation, fishing or the 
conservation of the living resources of the sea .... " (See Appendix D for 
full text.) 
117 Secretary of Interior Ickes said of the United States Proclamation of 1945: 
"We have acquired jurisdiction over the Continental Shelf, which iR about 
760,000 square miles of underwater land from which we may replenish some of 
our depleted mineral reserves . . . the Continental Shelf ranks with the lands 
which we acquired by the Louisiana Purchase, or by the opening of the West, 
or by the purchase of Alaska." Annual Report, Secretary of Interior 1945, 
pp. vi, ix-x. 
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2. Early 20th Century Claims to Continental Shelf Resources 
The first claim during the 20th century to continental shelf r e-
sources was that of the Portuguese Government in 1910 which issued 
a decree regulating fishing by steam vessels.118 The year 1916 wit-
nessed both an official claim by a state and an unofficial expression of 
interest in the resources of the continental shelf. However, the claim 
was to certain islands on the continental shelf, rather than to the 
sea bed or subsoil, and the expression o£ interest was in pelagic fish-
eries in the superjacent waters, not unlike some o£ the recent claims 
o£ Latin American countries. 
The expression o£ interest was unofficial, the Spanish oceanographer 
Odon de Buen urging at the National Fishery Congress in Madrid in 
1916 that the territorial sea be extended to encompass the whole o£ 
the continental shelf in order to conserve the fisheries.119 H e viewed 
exclusive control (i.e., sovereignty) by the coastal state as the only 
effective means o£ conservation and protection o£ fisheries :from de-
structive, competitive exploitation. Some thirty years later the United 
States proclamation on fisheries stressed a similar need £or coastal 
states to establish fisheries conservation zones, but not by extending the 
terri to rial sea.120 
The official claim in 1916 was that o£ the Imperial R-ussian Govern-
ment, which informed other governments that she considered the 
uninhabited islands north o£ Siberia as an integral part o£ Russia 
because they were located on and formed "a northward extension o£ 
the continental platform o£ Siberia." 121 This same claim was later 
reasserted by the Government o£ the U.S.S.R. in a special memoran-
dum issued on 4 November 1924 to the governments o£ all states.122 
118 1 Laws and R.egulations on the Regime of the High Seas, U.N. Doc. ST/ 
LEG/SER. B/1, 19 (1951). 
u
9 U.N. Doc. A/ON. 4/17,34 (1950). 
120 Presidential Proclamation No. 2668 (Sept. 28, 1945) 59 Stat. 885. The 
Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the 
High Seas in Article 6 acknowledges that "A coastal State bas a special interest 
in the maintenance of the productivity of the living resources in any area of 
the high seas adjacent to its territorial sea." However, nothing in the conven-
tion suggests that a coastal State's special interest gives it "exclusive" fishing 
rights beyond the territorial sea. (U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 54 and Add. 1 
(1958)). _In fact r a provision (Art. 3) adopted by the First Committee (Ter-
ritorial Sea and Contiguous Zone) which would have given each coastal state 
a 12-mile exclusive zone was defeated in plenary meetings and hence not 
included in the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. (3 
Official Records 258 and 2 Official Records 39). 
121 Laktine, Rights Over the Arctic Regions 43-45 (1928). 
122 Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy 476 (1951) . 
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Does this Russian declaration o£ 1916, reasserted in 1924, represent 
an adumbration of the present continental shel£ doctrine? It seems 
logical to argue that it was not £or two reasons: First, the Russian 
claim was to islands (i.e., dry land mass) rather than to the resources 
o£ the sea bed and subsoil o£ the continental shelves. Secondly, the 
basis £or the claim was not the continental shel£ theory but the sector 
theory which was subsequently elaborated by a Soviet writer.123 
Professor Francois, in his Report on the Law o£ the High Seas to 
the International Law Comrnission,124 argues that the term "continental 
platform" as it appears in the Russian declaration of 1916 is not used 
in the same sense as it is today. Said he, 
"The rights claimed by the Soviet Union in polar waters 
should . . . be considered in relatiorr to the 'theory o£ sec-
tors'. . . . The Soviet Government has not submitted any 
claims on the basis o£ the 'continental shel£' theory nor has 
it replied to the claims o£ other States." 125 
That the claim o£ the Russian Government in 1916, repeated in 
1924, to islands on the northern "continental continuation" o£ Siberia 
is based upon the sector theory, rather than upon the continental 
shel£ theory is further corroborated by the United Nations Secre-
tariat's Memorandum on the Soviet Doctrine and Practice with 
Respect to the Regime o£ the High Seas (1950), which refers to an 
"extension o£ the 'sector' principle declared as governing Soviet 
claims to territory in the Arctic Ocean." 126 
The next event which might be considered as an expression o£ in-
terest in the resources o£ the continental shelf occurred in 1918 and 
involved the State Department o£ the United States. To some extent 
123 Laktine, "Rights Over the Arctic," 24 A.J.I.L. 703, 708 (1930). For a criticism 
of the sector theory see Franklin & McClintock, "The Territorial Claims of 
Nations in the Arctic: An Appraisal," 5 Oklahoma Law Review 37 (1952). Under 
the sector theory the U.S.S.R. claimed a pie-shaped area northward to the North 
Pole from the outward limits of her territory. 
124 U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/17,34 (1950). 
125 Ibid. Although the Soviet Government has not officially claimed its con-
tinental shelf resources, except by implication in signing the Convention on the 
Continental Shelf, nor protested the claims of other states to their continental 
shelves, l{oretsky, a Soviet international lawyer and former member of the 
International Law Commission, wrote an un~fficial, vitriolic denunciation of the 
Truman Proclamation, saying, an1ong other things, "The USA wants to become 
'ruler of the seas' and 'king of the ocean floor' ~m its road toward world domina-
tion." English translation of Koretsky's article appears in The Current Digest 
of the Soviet Press, Vol. II, No. 46, at 15 (Dec. 30, 1950). 
126 U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/38, 5 (1950). Mouton disagrees with the view that the 
Russian claims to the islands were predicated upon the sector theory rather than 
upon the continental shelf theory, but his arguments are not convincing. Mouton, 
op. cit., footnote 63 (at 241). 
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it was an expression of disinterest by the United States in the con-
tinental shelf. 
An American citizen, believing that oil lay in the subsoil of the 
Gulf of Mexico at a distance of about forty miles from land on a reef 
'vhere the water was less than one hundred feet deep, wrote to the 
State Department to inquire whether it would be possible to acquire 
property or leasehold rights to the particular tract of ocean bottom 
in order to be protected in an effort to obtain oil. The American sug-
gested that an artificial island might be erected and he inquired 
whether such an island could be brought under the jurisdiction of 
the United States.127 
The State Department informed the American that "the United 
States has no jurisdiction over the ocean bottom of the Gulf of Mexico 
beyond the territorial waters adjacent to the coast."128 However, 
although the above language did not indicate much interest, the rest 
of the letter suggested that the United States did have a veiled interest 
in such resources and possibly "would assume some sort of control over 
the island" if one were built by the United States citizen.129 
The year 1935 saw another expression of the American attitude 
toward the continental shelf. In the face of the Japanese threat to 
engage in salmon fishing off Alaska, the Copeland Bill ( S. 37 44) was 
passed by the Senate, which purported to extend the jurisdiction of 
the United States to 
". . . all the waters and submerged land adjacent to the coast 
of Alaska . . . and lying within the limits of the continental 
shelf having a depth of water of 100 fathoms, more or 
less." 130 
Although the Copeland Bill went no further than the Senate, it 
represents a precursor of the Truman Proclamation of 1945 regarding 
fisheries and may have influenced to some extent the formulation of 
the present continental shelf doctrine. 
3. Mid-Twentieth Century Claims to Continental Shelf Resources 
a. United Kingdom-Venezuela Treaty of 1942 
The first modern -day claim by states to the resources both of the 
sea bed and subsoil of the continental shelf as de fined in the Geneva 
Convention wa~ the treaty between the United Kingdom and Vene-
zuela of .26 February 1942, relating to the sub1narine areas of the 
127 II Hackworth, Digest of International Law 679-80 (1941). 
128 Ibid. at 680. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Leonard, International Regulation of Fisheries 134 .(1944). 
38 
Gulf of Paria located between Venezuela and the Island of Trinidad.131 
This treaty foreshadowed the Truman Proclamation of 1945, and 
many of the other decrees and proclamations which followed, in that 
it contained no claim to "sovereignty" over the submarine areas of the 
gulf, although it used language which, like the Truman Proclamation, 
was equivalent to a declaration of sovereignty.132 Similarly, the 
treaty foreshadowed many of the subsequent decrees and proclama-
tions in recognizing that the exploitation of the submarine areas 
should not affect the freedo1n of the superjacent high seas. 
b. The Truman Proclamation of 1945 
Notwithstanding the importance of the United Kingdom-Vene-
zuela treaty, the real beginning of the continental shelf doctrine is 
the Truman Proclamation of 1945.133 Most of the subsequent claims 
by states to their continental shelf resources refer to the Truman 
Proclamation, either directly or indirectly, and any expansion of the 
continental shelf concept must be judged in the light of this original 
proclamation. · 
The Truman Proclamation was a ·formidable document. It laid 
claim to a greater submarine area than any other claim in history 
and one which, in view of the advanced state of technology in the 
United States for the recovery of oil from underseas areas, gives some 
prospect of extensive realization of these important resources. More-
over, the proclamation is important because it represented the first 
expression of a philosophy in regard to the continental shelf, abbrevi-
ated and incomplete though that philosophy was. 
The proclamation asserts in the first three of the four introductory 
recitals the raison d'etre justifying the exclusive claim by a coastal 
state to its continental shelf. The first three recitals declare: (1) the 
awareness of a long-range, worldwide need for new sources of petro-
leum and other minerals ; ( 2) the existence of these needed resources 
under the continental shelf and the technological feasibility of their 
exploitation either now or in the near future; and ( 3) the need for 
some recognized jurisdiction over these resources in the interest of 
their (a) conservation and (b) prudent utilization.134 
Discussions of the Truman Proclamation and the many other 
claims which followed shortly thereafter, are often confused and 
confusing because they fail to differentiate clearly between statements 
in the claims of conditions as distinguished from preferences (i.e., · 
131 British Treaty S eries, No. 10 (1942). Also see Vallat, "The Continental 
Shelf," 23 B.Y.I.L. 333 (1946). 
132 I bid. 
133 Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, 28 Sept. 1945, 59 Stat. 884, 10 Federal 
Register 12303. 
134 I bid. 
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goals of the coastal state and the world community) . Moreover, the 
discussions often blur the lines between doctrine and practice and pay 
too little attention to alternatives, both in goals and in the methods 
for achieving the goals. The analysis here will attempt to differenti-
ate these several facets of the total problem. 
The first recital of the Truman Proclamation is in terms of a 
conditiorn viewed from the ·world community perspective (i.e., the 
"'vorld-,vide need for new resources"). Nothing is said in the first 
recital about the need of the United States or any other coastal state 
for these new resources, although such need is clearly implied. Nor 
is the need expressed in the proclamation in terms of the required 
resources o:f the free world bloc vis-a-vis the Soviet bloc, largely, one 
Inay assume, because at the time (September 1945) the cold war had 
not set in nor had the cleavage of the bipolar world become so 
apparent. 
The second recital, like the first, was also stated in terms of 
conditions (i.e., the existence of needed resources and the technology 
to exploit them). By implication, at least, these conditions were 
stated in terms of the world perspective rather than from the perspec-
tive of a single state. There was no suggestion that only the con-
tinental shelves of the United States contained petroleum and other 
needed minerals, nor was there a suggestion that only the United 
States had the necessary technology for their exploitation, despite the 
known leadership of the United States technology in this field. 
The third recital, unlike the first two, expressed a preferenc·e 
for values in terms of the previously stated conditions. It postulated 
a preference for "recognized jurisdiction over these resources" mean-
ing an ultimate recognition by the world community of the right of 
the coastal state to the jurisdiction over continental shelf resources, 
thei:c extent and limits nowhere defined, because of the stated prefer-
ences for order in conservation and prudent utilization. 
The fourth recital in the Truman Proclamation is of sufficient im-
portance to warrant stating it in its entirety: 
"Whereas it is the view of the Government of the United 
States of America that the exercise of jurisdiction over the 
natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the Continental 
Shelf by the contiguous nation is reasonable and just, (1) 
since the effectiveness of measures to utilize or conserve these 
resources would be contingent upon cooperation and protec-
tion from the shore, (2) since the Continental Shelf may be 
regarded as an emtension of the land mass of the coastal nation 
and thus naturally appurtenant to it, (3) since these re-
sources frequently form a seaward emtension of a pool or 
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deposit lying within the territory, and ( 4) since self-protec-
tion compels the coastal nation to keep close watch over 
activities off its shores which are of the nature necessary for 
the utilization of these resources; . . . ." 135 (Emphasis and 
numbers added.) 
It will be noted that this fourth recital begins by saying that it 
is the United States view that the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable 
and just. Reasonableness and justice are recognized general norms in 
international law. Their invocation in support of the United States 
claim is justified. However, it is surprising that the United States 
did not rely upon one or more 'of the sources of international law as 
set forth in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, in addition to the general norms of reasonableness and justice. 
International custom could have been invoked in vie·w of the long 
history of claims by coastal states to sea bed and subsoil resources as 
summarized above. Moreover, although it was recent, the Anglo-
Venezuelan treaty of 1942 might have been referred to. Instead, the 
United States proclamation argued the present reasonableness and 
justice of coastal jurisdiction largely in terms of physical, technologi-
cal, and political conditions, as well as in terms of state preferences 
:for wealth, power, and security, even though the terms wealth, po·wer 
and security were not used to describe the values at stake. 
The United States proclamation of 1945 says that the exercise 
by the coastal state of jurisdiction over the continental shelf "is rea-
sonable and just," which suggests a statement of what the law is, 
thereby justifying the assertion of the claims to the resources. How·-
ever, the failure to invoke any of the customary sources of international 
law in support of the "is" leads to the conclusion that the statement 
really amounts to either (1) an expression of what the law in regard 
to the continental shelf would be if other states followed the lead of 
the United States and thereby developed a customary international 
law of the continental shelf, or (2) an expression in 1945 of what the 
law ought to be, after considering all relevant policies and variables 
in context and after projecting within the limits of human errors of 
foreseeability. 
It is not suggested that the decision-makers who drafted the 
United States proclamation should have invoked some of the recog-
nized sources of international law in8tead of promulgating the reasons . 
why the coastal state should have control and jurisdiction (or "sover-
eignty" as the less timid have called it) over its continental shelf, but 
rather these sources should have been delineated in the proclamation 
135 Ibid. 
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in addition to the description o:f the physical, technological and power 
conditions in the world and the statement o:f preferences. 
I:f the United States proclamation had been predicated essentially 
upon established sources o:f international law, particularly upon 
"customary international law" which has long recognized the right 
o:f coastal states to exercise sovereignty over subn1arine subsoil re-
sources beyond coastal waters to the extent of existing technology, 
and over sea bed resources (sedentary fisheries) under a custon1 going 
back many centuries, several desirable results might have ensued 
there :from: ( 1) some o:f the claims promulgated after the United 
States proclamation might have been both clearer and more moderate; 
(2) n1uch o:f the confusion which has attended n1any of the delibera-
tions o:f the International Law Commission and other international 
legal bodies might have been a voided; and ( 3) the basis for a great 
deal o:f the criticism o:f the United States proclamation and of the 
'vhole concept o:f the continental shelf might have been removed in 
large part. 
This is not to suggest that states cannot justifiably take action :for 
the purpose o:f securing for themselves values 'vhich they desire unless 
they invoke some existing doctrine or practice to justify their action. 
The need :for action to secure values must never be shackled and iinmo-
bilized merely :for want o:f existing legal prescriptions. A decision-
maker is not to be confined, in the determination o:f the la 'v:fulness o:f 
his action, or proposed course o:f action, to the precedents o:f prior 
international conventions or prior international custom, but "may 
draw creatively upon a great variety o:f principles, precedents, analo-
gies, and considerations o:f :fairness." 136 But when, as here, prior 
doctrine and practice of states with respect to the exploration and 
exploitation o:f the resources o:f submarine areas 'vere at hand, the 
United States proclamation should have invoked them. 
Nor is it being suggested that the decision-makers who drafted 
the United States proclamation were incorrect or unwarranted in their 
indication o:f preferences, and in their recital o:f physical, technological 
and political conditions to justify the reasonableness o:f a coastal 
136 McDougal, "The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the International Law of the 
Sea," 49 A.J.I.L. 356, 359. McDougal suggests that the Anglo-Norwegian Fish-
eries case is an excellent example of the process by which external decision-
makers appraise unilateral claims. In this case Norway asserted claims which 
could not be justified by reference either (1) to explicit agreement, or (2) to 
widely accepted custom, and which had been protested by other states. But, 
by drawing upon ·all relevant sources of policy and a great variety of considera-
tions in the context of the case, the Court concluded that Norway's claims were 
lawful. (Judgment of 18 December 1951. [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 116.) Als~ see 
Waldock, "The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case," 28 B.Y.I.L. 114 (1951). 
607631-61--4 
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state's exercise of jurisdiction over the resources of the sea bed and 
subsoil of its continental shelf. On the contrary, the assertions 'vere 
quite accurate, as the following analysis of the expressed language in 
the fourth recital of the Truman Proclamation demonstrates. 
( 1) Assertions: 
(a) "The effectiveness of measures to utilize or conserve 
these resources would be contingent upon cooperation and protection 
from the shore." This statement of a condition regarding technology 
and exploitability of submarine resources is a recognition of the fact 
that technological and economic considerations make impracticable the 
exploitation of the resources without considerable cooperation from 
the shore. Shore-based operations for the building of offshore in-
stallations and maintaining and supplying such installations, as well 
as shore-based pumping stations to service pipelines fr~m the offshore 
drilling platforms, would be necessary. While, admittedly, it would 
be possible for an overseas state to build and service high seas drilling 
platforms, it 'vould be far less practicable than for the coastal state 
to do so. 
From the standpoint of legal theory and prior doctrine this 
part of the proclamation impliedly, though not expressly, suggests 
that proximity of the coastal state to the continental shelf is more 
conducive to "effective occupation.'' 
(b) "The Continental Shelf may be regarded as an extension 
of the land mass of the coastal nation and thus naturally appurtenant 
to it." This statement of conditions as to the physical universe is 
geologically correct. It is unfortunate that the International Law 
Commission did not include this concept of the "extension of the htnd 
mass" in its definition of the continental shelf in 1951, 1953 and 1956.131 
However, in fairness to the Commission, in justifying the coastal 
state's claim to the continental shelf the comments following the final 
draft articles did recognize the oneness of the land mass and the con-
tinental shelf, saying: 
"Neither is it possible to disregard the phenomenon of ge-
ography, whether that phenomenon is described as propin-
quity, contiguity, geographical continuity, appurtenance or 
identity of the submarine areas in question with the non-sub-
merged contiguous land." 138 
(c ) "These resources frequently form a sea ward extensioil 
of a pool or deposit lying within the territory." Again, the stateme.nt 
137 U.N. Doc. A/ 1858, 17 (1951); U.N. Doc. A/2456, 12 (1953); U.N. Doc. A/3159, 
41 (1956). 
138 U.N. Doc. A/3159, 43 (1956). 
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of conditions of the physicalr:ni Ycrse is geologically correct. A strong 
reason for granting the coas~al state exclusive rights to the resources 
of its continental shelves is to fo~~estall "whipstocking" 139 of domestic 
oil pools beyond territorial 'Yaters by overseas states. Of course, the 
problem of "whipstocking" must still be solved in those areas where 
one or more nations have common continental shelves. 
(d) "Self-protection compels the coastal nation to keep close 
'vatch over activities off its shores which are of the nature necessary 
for the utilization of these resources." Implicit in this statement is 
an awareness of the world power process and the inherent threat to 
peace and freedom in the world community. To this extent it is a 
statement of conditions 'vhich justify, at least as one alternative 
method, .a coastal state's control and jurisdiction over its continental 
shelf and the resources thereof. 
That the International Law Commission was also aware of 
the same conditions of insecurity in the world and the need arising 
out of those conditions for the coastal state to exclude foreign states 
from building installations on the coastal state's continental shelf is 
indicated in the comments following the 1951 provisional draft 
articles: 
"It would seem to serve no purpose to refer to the sea bed 
and subsoil of the submarine areas in question as res nullius 
capable of being acquired by the first occupier. That concep-
tion might lead to chaos. . . . " 140 
But the fourth recital of the Truman Proclamation which 
refers to the compelling need for self-protection, is more than an 
implied statement of world conditions. It is also an indication of 
a coastal state's demand for security, and an implied reference to a 
recognized principle of international law which confers upon each 
state the inherent right to take whatever unilateral (or collective) 
measures are necessary to provide for its security.141 To this extent 
139 "Whipstocking" is a term used in petroleum engineering to describe direc-
t ional drilling. A long wedge is placed in a well to deflect the drill a t an angle. 
By this process it is possible for a drilling rig to be located on one property and 
t he well to be bottomed on an adjoining property. H owever, t here are practical 
limits to direction drilling. At the present time t he greatest maximum hori-
zontal distance that can be attained is 7,000 to 8,000 feet, with the possibility of 
a 10,000 to 12,000 feet horizontal distance being a ttained in the future. See 
U.N. Prep. Doc. No. 20 a t 22 (1958). 
140 U.N. Doc. A/1858, comment 4 a t 18 (1951). Also see U.N. Doc. A/ 2456, par. 
73 at 14 (1953 ) ; U.N. Doc. A/3159, 43 (8) (1956). 
141 Article 51 of the United Nations Charter provides: "Nothing in the present 
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if 
an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security 
Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security." Also see Bowett, Self-Defense in International La,w 3 (1958). 
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the Truman Proclamation does refer, though not explicity, to the 
right of self -defense. 
It should be noted that the proclamation makes no claim to 
an extension of territorial waters. However, it does purport to extend 
maritime jurisdiction by claiming the right to use the high seas to 
the extent necessary, with due deference to the long-established doc-
trine of freedom of the seas, for the purpose of exploring and exploit-
ing submarine resources of the continental shelf. It is clear that, 
even in the absence of such an extension of jurisdiction and control 
over its continental shelf, the United States, as well as other coastal 
states, would not tolerate mineral exploitation or the building of 
"radar islands" or guided missile launching platforms on its shelves 
immediately beyond the limit of territorial waters. Both security 
and economic considerations render such foreign exploi~ation of a 
coastal state's continental shelf intolerable. 
(2) Jurisd.iction and control versus sovereignty 
The operative part of the Truman Proclamation states that 
the government of the United States regards the natural resources of 
the subsoil and the sea bed of the continental shelf beneath the high 
seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United States as appertaining 
to the United States, subject to its jurisdiction and control.142 
It is appropriat'e at this point to comment upon the various 
views which have been expressed among legal scholars as to whether 
the United States' assertion of "jurisdiction and control" is the same 
as "sovereignty." 143 
The use of the carefully selected ter1ninology, "jurisdiction 
and control," may have been motivated in part by a circumspect desire 
to avoid any possible accusation by unfriendly powers that the United 
States was trying to become a submarine imperialist, even while casting 
aside the last mantle of imperialism by freeing the Philippines.14 i 
The efforts to avoid such an accusation were generally successful, but 
not entirely so.145 
142 Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, 28 Sept. 1945, 59 Stat. 884, 10 Federal 
Register 12303. 
143 Committee IV of the Geneva Conference (1958) also discussed at some length 
the appropriate language to use in defining the rights of the coastal state over 
its continental shelf, finally eschewing the term "sovereignty" lest it connote 
rights over the superjacent waters in contravention of the doctrine of 'mare 
liberum, and approving the term "sovereign rights." U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/38 
(1958). Also see Whiteman, "Conference on the Law of the Sea: Convention on 
the Continental Shelf," 52 A.J.I.L. 629, 636 (1958). 
144 Grunder and Livezey, "The Philippines and the United States" (1951), esp. 
Ch. XV. The Philippines were grante9- independence 4 July 1946. 
145 See comments by Koretsky, op. cit., footnote 125. 
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Moreover, it seems reasonable to assume that those who 
drafted the Truman Proclamation were desirous of claiming some-
thing less than full sovereignty and therefore used not only the terms 
"jurisdiction and control" but also claimed only the "natural re-
sources" of the continental shelf rather than the sea bed and subsoil 
of the continental shelf itself. The State Department expressed the 
vie'v that the Truman Proclamation did not extend United States 
sovereignty beyond territorial waters, saying: 
"The territorial limits of the United States are precisely 
the same as before September 28, 1945, namely, three marine 
miles sea ward from the coast. . . . " 146 
The United Nations Secretariat took a similar view in its 
1950 me1norandum on the Regime of the High Seas; saying that "It 
'vould appear wrong to identify with sovereign rights the rights to 
the United States continental shelf claimed under the President's 
Proclamation." 147 
Several legal scholars 'vere of the same opinion. Young 
'vrote that "President Truman's proclamation of 1945 made no claim 
on behalf of the United States to 'sovereignty,' 'title,' or 'ownership' 
of the continental shelf." 148 
Sir Cecil Hurst first wrote that "the text of the (Truman) 
proclan1ation does not purport to effect any extension of the 
sovereignty of the United States." 149 Ho,vever, subsequently in the 
same article Hurst admitted that the distinction between the juris-
diction and the exclusive control which are claimed and sovereignty 
is so small as to be little more than a question of name, saying: 
"One cannot read this Proclamation without feeling that 
'vithin the area of its Continental Shelf, the United States 
is claiming rights which are as large as sovereignty ... if 
tlie rights claimed over the Continental Shelf and its 
146 13 Department of State Bulletin 484 (1945). Also see Selak, "Recent 
Developments in High Seas Fisheries Jurisdiction Under the President's 
Proclamation of 1945," 44 A.J.I.L. 680 (1950). 
147 U.N. Doc. A/ON. 4/32, 81 (1950). 
148 Young, "Recent Developments with Respect to the Continental Shelf," 
42 A.J.I.L. 849, 850 (1948). Young related the language of the Truman Proc-
lamation to that of the century-old Guano Islands Act of 1856 which provided 
that under certain specified conditions Guano Islands n1ay "at the discretion 
of the President of the United States be considered as appertaining to the 
United States." (11 Stat. 119.) 
149 Hurst, "The Continental Shelf," 34 Grotius Society Transactions 149 (1949). 
Also see Report of Conference International Law Association, 133 Copenhagen, 




resources were called sovereignty, they would be no more 
extensive than what are clain1.ed in the Proclamation." 150 
It is submitted that the last statements of Sir Cecil Hurst 
are correct, namely, that there is no essential difference between sov-
ereignty over the continental shelf and the language "jurisdiction and 
control" over the "natural resources'' as used in the Truman Procla-
mation. Or, to state it another way, it is distinction without a 
di f! erence. 
W aldock, another distinguished English writer, agreed with 
Hurst's later expressions, saying that "the Proclamation looks very 
like an act of appropriation." 151 Similarly, Judge Lauterpacht 
agreed that the United States Proclamation was an assumption of 
sovereignty over the continental shelf, saying: 
" ... while for reasons of its constitutional law and of 
attachment to consistency in its diplomatic practice the 
United States may have resorted to a terminology intended\ 
to dispel the appearance of assumption of sovereignty, it 
used words and assumed powers which in fact can have no 
other result.'' 152 
Brierly was of the opinion, also, that "jurisdiction and con-
trol'' was equivalent to sovereignty.153 Vallat concurred, saying that 
"'jurisdiction and control' are tantamount to sovereignty." 154 Mou-
ton also agreed, although he expressed some reservation as to the full 
equivalency of "jurisdiction and control" and "sovereignty," saying, 
"It seems that there is strong evidence that control and jurisdiction 
is the same right, or nearly the same right, as sovereignty." 155 
Although it seems clear that the words of the Truman Proc-
lamation, "jurisdiction and control" over the "natural resources" of 
the continental shelf are the equivalent, or nearly the equivalent of a 
claim of sovereignty, the conflict of views is worthy of some elabora-
tion for the following reasons : First, many of the subsequent proc-
lamations of states actually used the term "sovereignty" on the theory 
that no more was being claimed than had been claimed by the United 
States in claiming "jurisdiction and control." 156 
150 Hurst, op. cit., footnote 149 (at 160). 
151 Waldock, "The Legal Basis of Claims to the Continental Shelf," 36 Grotius 
Society Transactions128 (1950). 
152 Lauterpacht, op. cit., footnote 88 (at 389). 
llia U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/SR. 68, 8 (1950). 
154 Vallat, "The Continental Shelf," 23 B.Y.I.L. 336 (1946). 
155 Mouton, op. cit., footnote 63 (at 278). 
156 U.S. Naval War College International Law Documents, 1948-49, 187 (1950). 
The Argentine Republic Presidential Decree of 11 October 1946 said that the 
United States had issued a declaration asserting sovereignty over the peripheral 
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Second, several of the states \vhich did not use the term 
"sovereignty" did use alternative language which was as strong, if 
not stronger, than the language used by the United States (e.g. , the 
sea bed and subsoil of the continental shelf, or the resources thereof, 
were said to "belong to" 157 or are "integrated into the," 158 or shall 
"be included in the territories of .... " 159 
Third, the International Law Con1mission spent considerable 
time debating the terminology to be used and ultimately changed its 
original position. In the provisional draft articles of 1951 the Com-
mission used the terminology "control and jurisdiction," 160 \vhereas 
in the revised draft articles of 1953, after having received the criti-
cisms of many states, in addition to the criticisms of some members 
of the Commission, those words were changed to the less-timid, though 
no more inclusive, term, "sovereign rights." 161 
After much debate, the term "sovereign rights" was also used 
in the Geneva Convention as a sort of compromise between "control 
and jurisdiction" and "sovereignty." 162 It is difficult to see ho'v the 
term "sovereign rights" can mean anything less than "sovereignty," 
particularly when the Convention provides that the "coastal State 
exercises over the continental shelf exclusive rights for the purpose 
of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources." 163 
Basically the problem that could not be resolved in the 
minds of those \vho objected to the use of the term "sovereignty" 
was that historically and conceptually "sovereignty" was vertical 
rather than horizontal. Secondly, some international la \vyers and 
government officials have too long thought of international la \V as a 
body of static, rigid rules of precise and unchangeable meaning, un-
related to policies as factors and instruments in the guiding and 
shaping of decisions for the maximization of values.164 This pre-
epicontinental seas and continental shelves. This statement is clearly in error, 
as a careful reading of the Truman Proclamation will show. Yet the Decree 
indicates that Argentina was considering the United States claim to "jurisdic-
tion and control" as being the equivalent to a claim of "sovereignty." 
157 MacChesney, op. cit., footnote 71 (at 487). 
158 Ibid. at 444. 
159 Ibid. at 486. Also see Bahrain Proclamation which uses the language "sub~ 
ject to the sphere of its absolute jurisdiction and its absolute authority." 1 Laws 
and Regulations on the Regime of the High Seas. U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/1, 
25 (1951). 
160 U.N. Doc. A/1858, Art. 2, 18 (1951). 
161 U.N. Doc . .A/2456, Art. 2, 12 (1953). 
162 U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 55, Art. 2 (1958). 
163 Ib,id. 
164 For an elaboration of this idea see l\IcDougal, "International Law, Power 
and Policy: A Contemporary Conception," 1 Recueil des Oours 137, 14S-145 
(1Vn3). 
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occupation 'vith concepts and rules which were perhaps valid for the 
past but which are no longer adequate for contemporary conditions, 
has given to the term "sovereignty" the connotation of (a) "vertical 
o'vnership," meaning that he who owned the land mass also owned 
to the center of the earth and to the sky, and (b) the connotation of 
"absoluteness" meaning that sovereignty is exclusive and complete, 
never partial or dual or subject to the slightest derogation. U nques-
tionably this thinking resulted in the hesitancy of some states, includ-
ing the United States, 165 to use the term "sovereignty" in claiming 
the continental shelf or the resources thereof. 
As previously indicated, although Hurst concluded that the 
'vords "jurisdiction and control" in the United States Proclamation 
'vere the same as "sovereignty," 166 he 'vas troubled by the fact that a 
declaration of sovereignty over the continental shelf would create a 
line which made a "gigantic zigzag" and hence would conflict with 
the neat little notion that sovereignty was "vertical." He wr~te: 
" ... Hitherto it has, I believe, been generally assumed that 
the lilnit of a State's sovereignty is a vertical straight line 
stretching up,vards and downwards ad infinitum from the 
starting point. Was the Continental Shelf policy intended 
to introduce a new syste1n? A system under which the ·limits 
of a State's sovereignty would be a line \vhich made a gigantic 
zigzag .... " 167 
Of course, there is nothing sacred about the concept that 
sovereignty is "vertical"; it can be both vertical and horizontal, the 
same as it can be and often is dual, as well as singular. It can be 
exclusive as to the utilization o£ a resource (e.g., the exclusive right 
of a coastal state to fish in territorial waters or exploit its continental 
shelf), at the same time and yet subject to the overriding needs of 
the world community in that such sovereignty must accommodate 
itself to the inclusive uses demanded by other states, such as the right 
of innocent passage in territorial waters, and the right of navigation, 
fishing, scientific research, etc., in areas of the high se,as occupied by 
continental shelf installations of the coastal state. In short, the idea 
of sovereignty de1nands respect but not reverence, deference but not 
deification. 
One of the more creative thil).kers among international law-' 
yers has suggested the idea of "horizontal" sovereignty/68 and others 
165 Whiteman, op. cit., footnote 143 (at 629, 636). 
166 Hurst, op. cit., footnote 149 (at 149). 
167 Ibid. 
168 U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/SR. 199, 10, comments of Judge Lauterpacht then a mem-
ber of the I.L.C. 
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subsequently have given support to the idea that the delimiting line 
of a state's sovereignty 1night "zigzag" a little.169 
c. Claims of States Subsequent to the Truman Proclamation. 
Enough has been said of the Truman Proclamation to permit a 
comparative analysis of several of the representative types of claims 
by states to their continental shelves, and, often, to the fisheries re-
sources of the superjacent waters. The discussion of many of these 
claims to the continental shelf will involve some overlap "rith a dis-
cussion of state practice relative to territorial 'vaters and the at-
tempted extension thereof to distances up to 200 n1iles fro1n shore. 
The United States claim opened the bidding on the continental 
shelf in 1945. Several of the states which have followed the United 
States lead have doubled and, in a few cases, re-doubled the original 
bid. Many subsequent claims, although they either expressly or im-
pliedly refer to the Tru1nan Proclamation as precedent, go far beyond 
its scope. 
The Truman Proclamation on the continental shelf was, as we 
have seen, couched in terms of "jurisdiction and control," and avoided 
a claim of "sovereignty" 170 or "title." Moreover, the companion fish-
eries proclamation did not claim exclusive rights in the natural re-
sources of the sea contiguous to the United States, nor did it refer 
either expressly or by implication to the United States continental 
shelf.171 By contrast several of the subsequent clai1ns of other states 
asserted sovereignty not only over the continental shelf but also over 
the superjacent waters as well. 
In general the claims made subsequent to the Truman Proclama-
tion on the continental shelf may be grouped under three classifica-
tions: (1) those with a precise depth limit; (2) those with a precise 
width limit, regardless of depth; and ( 3) those effecting ,an indeter-
minarte extension of sovereignty, the extent of the claim not being 
precise either as to width or depth of superjacent 'vaters. Representa-
tive claims under each classification will be analyzed. 
(1) Claims to continental shelf with a precise depth limit of 
superjacent waters. A number of states, including Mexico, Nica-
ragua, Ecuador, and Pakistan, have asserted this type of claim, a fe'v 
of which will be discussed. 
Scarcely a month after the Truman Procla1nation, the Presi-
dent of Mexico issued a declaration asserting Mexican control over 
the contiguous continental shelf, describing the shelf as bounded "by 
169 Mouton, op. cit., footnote 63 (at 278). 
170 Judge Lauterpacht contends that sovereignty is an "established term of a 
clarity transcending that of 'control and jurisdiction'.'' Lauterpacht, op. cit., 
footnote 88 (at 389, 392). His contention is debatable as to the clarity of the 
term. 
171 Presidential Proclamation No. 2668, 26 Se-ptember 1945, rm· Stat. 885. 
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the 'isobath,' that is, the line joining points at the same depth (200 
metres)." 172 The Mexican clain1 says that "this shelf clearly forms 
an integral part of continental countries," and goes on to enu1nerate 
some of the resources contained in the shelf-"natural resources, 
liquid and gaseous minerals, phosphates, calcium, hydrocarbons, etc." 
of inestimable value "'vhose legal incorporation into the national prop-
erty is urgent and cannot be delayed." 173 
Although not claiming control and jurisdiction over the pelagic 
fisheries off her coasts, Mexico did suggest that she ·,vas "taking steps 
to supervise, utilize and control the closed fishing zones necessary for 
the conservation of this source of wellbeing," declaring that the pro-
tection should consist of the extension of control and supervision 
irrespective of the distance from the coast.174 
Thus, while the l\1exican claiin to the continental shelf 'vas 
expressed in terms of the depth of the superjacent waters (i.e., 200 
meters) there was no coin parable limitation fixed for the width of 
anticipated pelagic fisheries zones of protection, nor did Mexico limit 
such zones to the superjacent 'vaters above her continental shelves. 
The Mexican claini in regard to her establishment of closed fishing 
zones 'vas tempered by a subsequent statement recognizing the "law-
ful rights of third parties based on reciprocity" and indicating that 
the rights of free navigation on the high seas 'vere not affected. 
In February 1951, Ecuador issued a decree which was labeled 
as relating to territorial 'vaters, but which proclaimed sovereignty 
over the continental shelf 'vith a precise depth limit of 200 meters of 
superjacent waters marking the outer edge. The decree also estab-
lished a fisheries protection zone in the high seas corresponding to 
this she] f (i.e., the protection zone was related to the shelf as 
defined) .175 
In addition, the decree specified a territorial sea of 12 nautical 
1niles but the inference to be dra 'vn from the total document "'aS 
that Ecuador purported to extend her territorial sea to include all 
'vaters covering the continental shelf. As was to be expected, both 
the United States and the United l{ingdom filed protests.176 
172 U.S. Naval War College International Law Documents, op. cit., footnote 156 
(at185). 
173 Ibid. 
174 Ibid. at 186. 
175 MacChesney, op. cit., footnote 71 (at 456). 
176 The United States protest of April 7, 1951, was silnilar to those filed with 
Chile, Peru and other Latin American countries. I.O.J. Pleadings, 1951, U.K.-
Norway, IV, at 603. The British protest of September 1951, invoked the 1951 
provisional draft articles of the International Law Commission which provide 
that "the exercise by a coastal State of control and jurisdiction over the con-
tinental shelf does not affect the legal status of the superjacent waters as high 
seas." Mouton, op. cit., footnote 63 (at 93-94). 
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In August 1952 Ecuador made her claim to sovereignty over 
the adjacent Inaritime zone even more emphatic and precise-this 
tin1e precise as to width rather than depth of the superjacent waters-
by joining with Chile and Peru in signing the Declaration of San-
tiago claiming 200 miles of high seas and pledging collaboration for 
the protection of marine resources in the area.177 Chile and Peru 
had individually made such extensive claims in 1947.178 United 
States efforts to conc1ude agreements with Chile, Ecuador and Peru 
to modify these 200-mile claims to sovereignty over the seas adjacent 
to their coasts have met with failure.179 
(2) Claims with a precise -width limit of superjacent waters. 
The second classification of claims is that which specifies a precise 
'vidth limit of high seas without reference to the depth of the super-
jacent waters over the continental shelf and, in many cases, even in 
the absence of a shelf in the geological sense. This type of claim has 
been asserted by a number of states, particularly the Latin American 
states of Chile, Peru, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Honduras. !Corea 
and Saudi Arabia have also asserted claims based upon a precise 
'vidth of high seas. 
Typical are the claims of Chile and Peru which, as previously 
indicated, asserted their sovereignty over a belt of the high seas ex-
tending 200 miles from their coasts. The Proclamation of Chile in 
1947 announced that the government 
". . . proclaims and confirms its national sovereignty over all 
the continental shelf adjacent to the continental and island 
coasts of its national territory whatever may be their depth 
below the sea." 180 
The Chilean proclamation then claimed ". . . national sover-
ei~nty over the seas adjacent to its coasts whatever may be 
their depths, and within those limits necessary in order tore-
serve, protect, preserve and exploit the natural resources of 
whatever nature found on, \vithin and belo\v the said seas ... 
at a distance of 200 nautical1niles from the coasts of Chilean 
territory." 181 
A similar zone was also claimed on all sides of Chile's island 
possessions. 
171 Departrnent of State Bulletin No. 860 (1.955). 
178 U.S. Naval War College International Law Documents, op. oit., footnote 
156 (at 188-192). 
1
711' "Santiago Negotiations on Fishery Conservation Problems Among Chile, 
Ecuador, Peru, and the United States, Sept. 14-0ct. 5, 1955." 33 Department 
of State Bulletin 1025 (1955). 
180 1 U.N. Leg. Ser. 6 (1951) 
181 Ibid. 
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Although the Chilean proc . _ --- l' ion repudiated any intent to 
affect "the legitimate rights of otl ~l.- , ~ ~ates on a basis of reciprocity" 
and "the rights of free navigation on tl1e high seas," it is clear that the 
claim to sovereignty over the high seas does constitute a complete 
and unjustified departure from international law. This departure 
was stressed by the United States Government in its note of 2 July 
1948, to Chile, protesting the extensive claims, saying: 
"In these respects, the United States Government notes 
in particular that ( 1) the Chilean Declaration confirms and 
proclaims the national sovereignty of Chile over the conti-
nental shelf and over the seas adjacent to the coast of Chile 
outside the generally accepted limits of territorial waters, 
and (2) the Declaration fails, with respect to fishing, to 
accord appropriate and adequate recognition to the rights 
and interests of the United States in the high seas off the 
coast of Chile." 182 · 
The principal reason advanced by Chile for the departure in 
the proclamation from generally accepted principles of international 
law is geological, as she emphasized in her elaborate comments on 
the 1951 provisional draft articles of the International Law Com-
mission.183 The continental shelf, in the strict geological sense, is so 
narrow and precipitous off the Chilean coast that a claim based upon 
a depth limit o:f 200 meters would have given Chile little by way of 
new resources over what she could already claim in the submarine 
areas beneath a three-mile territorial sea.184 
The Chilean proclamation, therefore, lays claim to resources 
of vast areas of submarine territory and high seas which in reality 
have no relation to the continental shelf in terms of the generally 
accepted geological concept of a 200-meter depth limit. The sub-
marine territory claimed is not the continental shelf but the conti-
nental slopes and deep ocean basins out to 200 miles from shore. In 
addition, Chile claims the fisheries above said slopes and deep ocean 
basins. Yet, her claim to the "continental shelf" is consistent with 
the depth-o:f-exploitability test in the Geneva Convention and will 
become meaningful when the world's technology permits the exploita-
tion of resources from these and other continental slopes and deep 
ocean basins. 
In her comments to the International Law Commission on the 
1951 provisional draft articles, Chile said 
182 U.N. Doc. A/ON. 4/19, 114 (1950). 
183 U.N. Doc. A/2456, Annex II, 43-46 (1953). 
1 8 4 XLI #2 Geographical Review, 185-209 (1951). Also see Second Repo;rt by 
Mr. Francois to the I.L.O., U.N. Doc. A/ON. 4/61 (1953). 
" ... there should be Iirmation of the right to estab-
lish an exclusive huntin fishing zone 200 sea miles wide 
... based on the followj "sons : ( 1) the special configura-
tion of the submarine sl , _ _ong the coasts of Chile; ( 2) the 
exploitation of the fisheries, which are of vital concern to 
Chile; ( 3) the inadequacy of three miles of territorial sea for 
protecting the fishing industry and preventing destruction of 
marine life; and ( 4) the improper jurisdiction exercised in 
the past and present by certain foreign vessels over Chilean 
fishermen, whose living comes mainly from the sea." 185 
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Moreover, Chile also argued that since other Latin American 
countries had followed the Chilean lead, a new doctrine of "con-
tinental seas or waters" (i.e., the right of each state unilaterally to 
determine the breadth of its territorial sea) had become part of inter-
nationallaw.186 Finally, the Chilean proclamation defended the 200-
mile claims in terms of the importance of fisheries to the economic life 
of the country, saying 
" ... in view of its topography and the narrowness of its 
boundaries, the life of the country is linked to the sea and to 
all present and future natural riches contained within it, more 
so than in the case of any other country." 187 
Recent studies by the United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Organization indicate that Chile may have overstated the importance 
of fisheries to her total economy. Chile is not listed among the 
fourteen leading countries whose product of sea fisheries is as much 
as one per cent or more of the aggregate domestic product, nor is she 
listed among the seventeen leading countries whose sea fishery landings 
are as much as $500 or more per capita of national income per year.188 
1 85 UN. Doc. A/2456, Annex II, 46 (1953). 
186 Ibid. The I.L.C. took a different view in its final draft articles in 1956, 
saying, "The Commission considers that international law does not permit an 
extension of the territorial sea beyond twelve miles." U.N. Doc. A/3159, 4 
Art. 3 (2), (1956). It is often claimed that each state may determine its own 
limits of territorial waters based upon what is reasonable, presumably with the 
reasonableness to be determined subjectively by the coastal state. The Inter-
national Court of Justice has effectively answered such contentions by saying 
in the Norwegian Fisheries Oase: "The delimitation of sea areas has 
always an international aspect; it cannot be dependent merely upon the 
will of the coastal State as expressed in its municipal law. Although it is 
true that the act of delimitation is necessarily a unilateral act, because only the 
coastal State is competent to undertake it, the validity of the delimitation with 
regard to other States depends upon international law." I.O.J. Reports 116, 132 
(1951). 
1871 . U.N. LerJ. Ser. 6 (1951). 
188 U.N. Prep. Doc. No. 13 A/CONF. 13/16, 2-5 (1957). 
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While it was valid for Chile to have disregarded her meager 
and in some cases non-existent continental shelf, geologically speak-
ing, in establishing fisheries protection zones/89 it was completely con-
trary to international law, as well as contrary to her own long-run 
interests, for her to have claimed sovereignty over a 200-mile belt of 
adj.acent seas for the protection of fisheries. These claims of sover-
eignty over high seas fisheries are reminiscent of the attempts of 
Spain, Portugal and the Scan dina vi an States three centuries ago to 
establish sovereignty over areas of the high seas in order to monopolize 
trade and fishing,190 attempts which gradually failed under the 
constant pressure of various Inaritime states for the establishment of 
freedom o:f the seas 191 and the eventual realization that the greatest 
benefit to all states would ensue from the widest possible sharing of 
this great common resource. 
Yet, while emphasizing the invalidity of Chile's claim to 
sovereignty over a 200-mile band of high seas adjacent to her coasts, 
it is only fair to protest against some of the more intemperate criti-
cisms of the Chilean action which impute bad faith to Chile, suggest-
ing that she "may justly be suspected of employing the continental 
shelf as protective cover for assertions of a wholly different 
character." 192 
There is no more justification for suggesting that Chile 
employed the continental shelf as "protective cover for assertions of a 
wholly different character," than there would be for a similar suggest-
tion as to the United States claim to fisheries conservation zones, even 
assuming that the United States had combined her two proclamations 
(fisheries conservation and continental shelf) into a single document, 
as did Chile. 
189 The United States proclamation establishing fisheries conservation zones, 
issued on the same day as the United States proclamation on the continental 
shelf, made no reference to the continental shelf and indeed did not even limit 
said zones to 200 miles from shore, as did the Chilean proclamation, but specified 
zones "in those areas of the high seas contiguous to the coasts of the United 
States wherein fishing activities have been or in the future may be developed 
and maintained on a substantial scale." (Presidential Proclamation No. 2668, 
September 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 885.) The omission of any reference in the United 
States proclamation on fishe~ies to the continental shelf was hardly an over-
sight, in view of the fact that the proclamation on the continental shelf was 
issued the same day. 
19° Fulton, op. cit., footnote 52 (at 4). 
191 Ibid. at 338 et. seq.~· Colombos, The International Law of th.e Sea 39-56 (3d 
rev. ed. 1954) ; Potter, The Freedom of the Seas 1-96 (1924). 
192 Anninos, The Continental Shelf ana Public International Law 43-44 (1953). 
Also see Lauterpacht, op. cit., footnote 88 (at412-13). 
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A careful reading of the Chilean proclamation reveals that the 
specification of width is in the paragraph referring to the protection 
zones for whaling and deep sea fisheries in the "continental and island 
seas," and not in the paragraph which relates to the claim of national 
sovereignty over the continental shelf in which there is no assertion 
of width but only a disclaimer of depth under superjacent waters as 
the criterion for limiting a coastal state's rights to the resources in and' 
under (not above) said shelf.193 
Moreover, the comments of the Government of Chile to the 
International Law CommisHion indicate that she was not trying to use 
the continental shelf doctrine as a "guise" or "protective cover" for 
claiming sovereignty over the fisheries zones out to 200 miles from 
shore. On the contrary, Chile clearly recognized that she had a nar-
row and in some cases a non -existent continental shelf in terms of the 
geological concept of a 200-meter depth limit. For this reason she 
argued strongly for the depth-of-exploitability test for the continental 
shelf, rather than the fixed depth limit, citing on her behalf the Com-
mission's own 1950 report that "where the depth of the waters per-
mitted exploitation, it should not necessarily depend on the existence 
of a continental shelf." 194 
The Chilean position in regard to the conservation of fisheries 
is therefore consistent in the following respect. If the legitimate 
claims to the resources of the sea bed and subsoil of the contiguous 
submarine areas are not dependent upon the existence of a continental 
shelf, defined by a 200-meter depth limit, then it is logical to argue 
that the right of a coastal state to protect, or at least participate in the 
protection of, pelagic fisheries resources in the contiguous zone, what-
ever its width, is not dependent upon the existence of a continental 
shel£.195 
.. However, Chile claimed more than the right to protect fisheries 
resources in cooperation with other states; she claimed sov,ereignty 
over the high seas for this purpose. Although she acknowledged the 
"legitimate rights of other States on a basis of reciprocity ... " and 
the "rights of free navigation on the high seas" 196 her exclusive claim 
is considerably greater than the United States inclusive claim of the 
right of "regulation and control" in certain "explicitly bounded con-
193 1 U.N. Leg. Ser. 6-7 (1951). 
194 U.N. Doc. A/2456, 44 ( 1953) . 
195 Iceland has taken the opposite position, namely, that her fisheries are 
closely related to her continental shelf and therefore the fisheries in the super-
jacent waters are as much a resource of the shelf for her as oil in the subsoil 
of the shelf is a resource for other countries, thereby justifying her exclusive 
claim to said fisheries. Iceland Law No. 44, Art. 1 (1948). Also see U.N. Doc. 
A/2456, 53 (1953). 
196 1 U.N. Leg. Ser. 6 (1951). 
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servation zones," with full recognition of the rights of other states to 
fish in said zones.197 
It is not the prerogative of Chile or of any other state to specify 
and limit the "legitimate (fishing) rights of other States on a basis of 
reciprocity." Such fishing rights outside of territorial waters, like 
the rights of navigation, belong to all states under the doctrine of 
freedom of the seas. The Convention on the High Seas provides 
that "the high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly 
purport to subject any part of them to its sovereignty."198 A similar 
provision is contained in the Convention on Fishing and Conserva-
tion of the Living Resources of the High Seas.199 
It follows, therefore, that the 200-mile claim of Chile, like 
those of the other countries 'vhich have attempted to extend their ter-
ritorial seas beyond three miles, thereby limiting the rights of other 
states to fish in those extended areas, is contrary to customary inter-
nationalla w and to the implied limitations within specific provisions 
of the Geneva Conventions. 
The United States proclamation relative to fisheries explicitly 
provides that 
" ... where such activities have been or shall hereafter be 
legitimately developed and maintained jointly by nationals 
of the United States and nationals of other States, explicitly 
bounded conservation zones may be established under agree-
ments between the United States and such other States, and 
all fishing activities in such zones shall be subj~ct to regula-
tion and control as provided in such agreements." 200 
This provision makes a much greater concession to other 
states than does the Chilean proclamation which only recognizes the 
"legitimate rights of other States on a basis of reciprocity." The 
United States proclamation is therefore specific as to how the rights 
of other states are to be recognized and sets forth the procedures (i.e., 
through agreements) for resolving conflicts and establishing regula-
tions and controls under the aegis of several states rather than under 
the exclusive control of the United States. 
It is worth emphasizing that the United States does not contem-
plate emclusive control of ,the fisheries conservation zones, nor is sov-
ereignty claimed over any part of the high seas, the proclamation pro-, 
viding t hat "the character as high seas of the areas in which such con-
197 Presidentia l Proclan1atiQn No. 2668, Sept. 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 885. 
198 U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 53 and corr. 1 Art. 2 (1958). 
199 U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 54 and Add. 1, Art. 1 (1958). 
200 Presidential Proclamation No. 2668, Sept. 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 885. 
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servation zones are established and the right to their free and unim-
peded navigation are in no 'vay thus affected." 201 
a. Summary and conclusions in regard to 0 hilean claims. 
1. The Chilean claim to sovereignty over her continental 
shelf, defining the shelf in ter1ns of depth-o:f-exploitability rather than 
a 200-meter depth limit was entirely valid, no less valid than the claim 
of the United States to exclusive jurisdiction and control over her con-
tinental shelves and entirely consistent "\vith the 1958 Geneva Conven-
tion on the Continental Shelf. 
2. The Chilean claim to sovereignty over a 200-mile belt of 
adjacent high seas for purposes of fishing was invalid and contrary to 
customary international la,v, and the implied limitations of the four 
Geneva Conventions of 1958, as 'vell as being contrary to the long-run 
interests of Chile and other coastal states in developing and conserving 
fisheries and in exploiting other uses of the high seas. 
3. Some of the criticisms of Chile are unwarranted, particu-
larly those which impute to her bad faith in using the continental shelf 
doctrine as a "guise" for claiming exclusive fishing rights. 
Peru, located to the north of Chile and finding herself in 
essentially the same geographical and geological situation, that is, 
without any continental shelf to speak of, issued a presidential decree 
in August 1947,202 only a little more than a month after the Chilean 
declaration. Peru modeled her decree after her neighbor's except for 
one important difference. The Peruvian decree made no mention of 
the legitimate rights of other States to fish in her conservation zone on 
a "basis of reciprocity." For this reason the Peruvian decree is even 
more objectionable than the Chilean declaration with respect to 
fisheries. 
The United States protest, couched generally in the lan-
guag~ used in the protest to Chile, objected (1) to the Peruvian claim 
of sovereignty over the continental shelf and the seas adjacent to the 
coast of Peru outside the generally accepted limit of territorial waters, 
and (2) to the failure, with respect to fishing, to accord recognition to 
the rights and interests of the United States in the high seas off the 
coasts of Peru.203 
Another claim worthy of comment is that of El Salvador, 
which in simple, brief, and inclusive language made the sweeping asser-
tion that its territory included "the adjacent seas to a distance of t'vo 
201 Ibid. 
202 Presidential Decree No. 781, "Con,cerning Submerged Continental or Insular 
Shelf," 1 Aug. 1947. Translation from 2 I.L.Q. 137 (1948) ; 1 U.N. Leg. Ser. 
16-17 (1951). 
203 U.N. Doc A/ON. 4/19, 113 (1950). 
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hundred sea miles from low water line and the corresponding air space, 
subsoil and continental shelf." 204 
A subsequent paragraph provided that "the provisions of 
the foregoing paragraph shall not affect the freedom of navigation in 
accordance with the principles recognized under International 
La\v." 205 This provision was comparable to the one in Peru's decree in 
that no mention was made of the rights of other nations, reciprocally, to 
fish in the 200-mile belt of adjacent seas. 
The United States sent a stronger note of protest to El 
Salvador than \Vas the case with Chile and Peru, probably for t\vo 
important reasons: (1) El Salvador claimed sovereignty, not only 
over the 200-mile adjacent seas, but over the corresponding air space. 
Sovereignty 'vas claimed, the United States protest pointed out, de-
spite the subsequent disclai1ner by El Salvador that her claim did not 
affect the "freedom of navigation" on the seas., and in the air. (2) 
Secondly, no indication was given by El Salvador that her claim to 
the 200-mile adjacent seas was for the purpose of establishing a 
fisheries protection and conservation zone. Instead, this broad ex-
panse of high seas was stated to be part of the "territory" of the 
Republic. 
The claim of El Salvador was rightly opposed by the United 
States. 
(3) Olaims affecting an indeterminate extension of sovereignty 
over adjacent submarine area and high seas. 
Representative of this type of claim are those of Argentina, 
Israel, and Australia. Barely a year after the Truman Proclamation, 
President Peron issued a decree "concerning national sovereignty 
over epicontinental sea and the Argentine continental shelf." 206 It 
declared the epicontinental sea and continental shelf to be "subject to 
the sovereign power of the nation." 207 However, in an attempt to 
follow the pattern of the Truman Proclamations regarding the con-
tinental shelf and fisheries conservation zones, the Argentine decree 
provided that 
". . . for the purposes of free navigation, the character of the 
waters situated in the Argentine epicontinental sea and 
above the Argentine continental shelf, remains unaffected by 
the present Declaration." 208 
204 El Salvador, Political Constitution (Sept. 1950). MacChesney, op. cit., foot-
note 71 (at 460). 1 U.N. Leg. Ser. 300 (1951). 
205 Ibid. 
206 1. U.N. Leg. Ser. 4 (1951), Argentine Decree No. 14,708 (11 Oct. 1946). 
207 Ibid. Art. 2. 
208 Ibid. Art. 3. 
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The Argentine decree nowhere defines the shelf or delimits 
the area claimed. It has been suggested that the reason for this fail-
ure to delimit the shelf may be related to her Antarctic claims. 
Young points out that the Falkland Islands, to which both Argentina 
and Great Britain lay claim, are located on the South American 
continental shelf, even under the 100 fathom definition . 209 
The above suggestion appears to have merit for two reasons : 
First, the United States, in her protest to Argentina took special care 
to point out that the "reservations thus made . . . are not intended to 
have relation to or to prejudice any Argentine claims with reference 
to the Antarctic Continent or other land areas." 210 Secondly, the 
British declaration with regard to her own claims to the continental 
shelf of the Falkland Islands may be viewed as a counter move to the 
S"\veeping Argentine claim. 211 
Using essentially the same language that was used in the pro-
tests to Chile and Peru, the United States protested the Argentine 
decree on the ground that it was "at variance with the generally ac-
cepted principles of international law." 212 Several writers have also 
criticized the extensiveness of Argentina's claims which, like those 
of Chile, Peru and other Latin American countries, assert a greater 
degree of sovereignty over the epicontinental seas than is justified in 
view of the long-established rights of all states to fish in the high 
seas. 
Of special interest in this classification of claims to the con-
tinental shelf involving a categorical extension of sovereignty with-
out a precise limit on the basis of either depth or width of superjacent 
waters are the claims of Israel (1952) 213 and Australia (1953).214 
The Israel claim is significant for two reasons : ( 1) First, the 
Israeli Government refused to use the term "continental shelf," 
despite its widespread use by the International Law Commission and 
by writers, preferring instead the term "submarine areas." (2) 
Secondly, the Israel claim explicitly avoided a definition or delimita-
tion of the submarine area in terms of a precise depth or width, using 
instead the depth-of-exploitability criterion of the Commission's 
1951 provisional draft articles. 
209 Young, op. cit., footnote 148 (at 849, 853). Also see Anninos, op. cit., 
footnote 192 (at 25). 
210 1 U.N. Leg. Ser. 5 (1951). 
2
u Falkland Islands Order in Council (21 Dec. 1950), Statutory Instruments 
No.2100. 1 V.N.Leg.Ser. 305 (1D51) . . 
212 U.N. Doc. A/ON. 4/10, 115 (1950). 
213 MacChesney, op. cit., footnote 71 (at 475). 
214 Ibid. at 442. 
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It could have been anticipated from statements made prior to 
the issuance of her proclamation that Israel would eschew the use of 
the term "continental shelf" and would not delimit her claims by 
using the 200-meter limit. Her government commented as follows: 
" ... The legal definition of the concept of the continental 
shelf should be divorced from the geological and scientific 
definition. That being so, the Commission's reasons for 
retaining the term 'continental shelf' are not. seen to be con-
vincing, and a phrase such as 'submarine areas' is considered 
preferable." 215 
Although the Israel proclamation does not use the term "sover-
eignty," there is no doubt from the language, which says that the 
territory of Israel is ewtended to include the sea bed and subsoil of 
the submarine area, that the intent was to claim full sovereignty over 
the continental shelf. 
Unlike the separate fisheries proclamation of the United States, 
or the proclamation of so many of the Latin American countries 
which combined their claims to the continental shelf and high seas 
fisheries, the Israel proclamation claimed only the resources of the 
submarine areas. A disclaimer clause was included saying that the 
elaim to the submarine areas in no way "shall affect the character 
as high seas" '· above the submarine areas.216 Differing sharply from 
most of the Latin American claims, the Israel proclamation reserved 
the rights of other states both as to navigation and fisheries, rather 
than to navigation alone. 
Two Australian proclamations issued 10 September 1953 
claimed the Australian continental shelf, and that of the Trusteeship 
Territory of New Guinea.217 Neither of these proclamations defines 
or delimits the continental shelf. For example, the proclamation 
relating to the Australian continental shelf says, 
". . . Australia has sovereign rights over the sea bed and 
subsoil of (a) the continental shelf contiguous to any part of 
its coasts. . . ." 218 
Just why Australia did not specify a precise depth limit for 
the continental shelf in her proclamation is puzzling in view of the 
fact that contemporaneously 'vith the publication of the two proc-
215 U.N. Doc. A/2456, 59 (1953). 
216 MacChesney, op. cit., footnote 71 (Art. 2 at 475). 
217 Ibid. at 44~. Also see "Australia and the Continental Shelf," 27 Austral-
ian Law Journal 458 (1953) ; Goldie, "Australia's Sovereignty Over Its Contig-
uous Continental Shelf," Australian Institute International Affairs, Vol. V. #4 
(Dec. 1953). 
218 MacChesney, op. cit., footnote 71 (at 442). 
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lamations an act was passed by the Australian Parliament, amending 
the Pearl Fisheries Act of 1952. This Act did define the continental 
shelf of Australia as 
". . . the sea bed and subsoil of the submarine areas contig-
uous to the coasts of Australia and of the submarine are as 
contiguous to the coasts of the Territories, to a depth o:f not 
more than one hundred fathoms." 219 
O'Connell admitted that the Australian proclarnations lacked 
precision as to limits, but explained that this was done purposely be-
cause the continental shelf "possesses the potentiality of expansion 
with the advance in techniques of exploitation of the sea bed." 220 
Yet, he referred with favor to the amending legislation relative to 
pearl fisheries which, as indicated above, did provide for a delimita-
tion of the continental shelf according to the 100 fathom criterion. 
It is not easy to follow the arguments of O'Connell nor to 
understand the ambivalent position of Australia which on the one 
hand (i.e., in the continental shelf proclamations) denied the need 
for defining or delimiting the continental shelf because of the shelf's 
potentiality of expansion with the advance in techniques of exploita-
tion of the sea bed, while on the other hand making a claim through 
contemporaneous legislation relating to pearl fisheries, for the purpose 
of excluding the Japanese pear ling fleet from a submarine area, 
which precisely defined the shelf in terms of a 100 fathom depth limit. 
Perhaps the most plausible explanation is that the pearl 
fisheries amending act which defined the continental shelf in terms of 
a precise depth limit did so for the purposes of the Act. Hence, for 
the purpose of excluding the Japanese (and other) pear ling fleets from 
the submarine areas adjacent to Australian coasts the continental 
shelf __is one thing, defined and delimited, whereas for all other pur-
poses and for all other claims by Australia the continental shelf is 
another thing, undefined and not delimited by the depth-of-exploita-
bility criterion. 
These dual definitions of the continental shelf by Australia are 
the only ones encountered so far.221 It would be unfortunate if the 
219 "Australia and the Continental Shelf," op. cit., footnote 217 (at 460). Also 
see O'Connell, op. cit., footnote 101 (at 193). 
220 Ibid. 
221 Of course, it is true that the Geneva Convention provides a kind of dual 
definition of 200 meter depth or, beyond that limit, to where the depth admits 
of exploitation. Yet, this is duality of time and technology, not duality of 
function and resources. In the case of Australia the continental shelf is de-
limited as to one resource (pearl fisheries) but not delimited as to all other 
resources. In the Geneva Convention the 200 meter depth limit or the depth-of-
exploitability criterion apply no matter what resources are at stake. 
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Australian 1nodel 'vere follo,ved by other states because it would only 
add confusion to the establishment of the continental shel:f doctrine 
in international law. It is surprising, indeed, that O'Connell should 
argue on the one hand that "it is this lack of precision in the various 
continental shelf claims that has provided a stumbling-block to the 
development of the law," 222 while at the same time defending the lack 
of precision in the Australian proclamations. 
4. Conclusion 
The foregoing analysis indicates some divergence in the extent of 
the clain1s by states to their continental shelves. However, the great-
est divergence occurs in the assertions of states to varying degrees of 
control and jurisdiction, including unabashed claims of sovereignty, 
over the fisheries and other resources of the high seas above or beyond 
the continental shelf. 
Because of the disagree1nents which developed after 1945 as a 
result of the excessive claims by some states over high seas fisheries 
resources, it is fortunate indeed that the International Law Com-
mission undertook a systematic study of the regime of the high seas in 
all of its 1najor aspects, resulting in the formulation of a set of 73 
draft articles. Six of these draft articles, with few modifications, 
'vere incorporated into the Geneva Convention on the Continental 
Shelf. 
Most of the proclamations and decrees issued after the Truman 
Proclamation of 1945 referred to the measures previously adopted by 
other states as proof of an emerging international doctrine and 
practice with respect to the continental shelf. Admittedly it is de-
batable as to when such international doctrine and practice became 
established as a part of customary international law, just as it is 
difficult to know when a route across a commons acquires "the char-
acter of an acknowledged path." 223 
Although it is a matter of opinion as to exactly when the parade of 
proclamations on the continental shelf developed a path which was 
not only discernible, but well-defined and acknowledged, it seems clear 
and indisputable that the path has now been established; the practice 
of states in regard to the continental shelf has become a part of 
customary international law. The 1958 Geneva Convention on the 
Continental Shelf in effect was declaratory of this new customary 
international law; one may even say that the Convention codified the 
newly-established law of the Continental Shelf. 
While it is 'true that the 46 states which signed the Convention are 
not bound by it until after they have ratified it and it will not become 
222 O'Connell, op. Qit., footnote 101 (at 194). 
223 Cobbett, Cases and Opinions on InternahonaZ Law 5-6 (3d ed. 1909). 
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effective until the twenty-second ratification or accession, the Conven-
tion is a persuasive statement of the present law of the continental 
shelf. In any controversy 'vhich may arise between states which 
have signed the Convention, or even between states which have not 
signed it, the judicial or arbitral body called upon to resolve the 
particular dispute should give it great weight. 
In addition to the Convention's significant probative value in dis-
putes which may arise, it will serve as a useful guide to state practice 
in the exploitation of continental shelf resources. As Miss Whiteman 
has said, 
" ... regardless of the number of its ratifications and acces-
sions, the Convention, together with the greatly similar 1956 
International Law Commission draft on the same subject, 
will, in the future, doubtless have considerable influence on 
the content and direction of the developing international law 
with respect to the continental shelf." 2'24 
This is not to say that the articles of the Convention are so clear 
and final that they provide a ready answer to all disputes which may 
develop between states, or between competing claimants within a state 
(i.e., continental shelf exploitation versus fisheries, navigation, etc.). 
On the contrary, it is to be anticipated that some of the Articles may 
prove to be inadequate, necessitating subsequent modification. 
Finally, it is to be hoped that in interpreting and applying the 
articles of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, as well 
as the three companion Conventions of 1958, writers, arbiters, judges, 
statesmen, and others will weigh the balance of decision in favor of 
inclusive rather than ewclusive uses 225 to the end that the coastal 
state's exercise of its exclusive rights to exploit the resources of the 
contjp.ental shelf will interfere as little as possible with navigation, 
communication, fishing, scientific investigation, and all other inclusive 
uses of the high seas by the 'vorld community of states. 
224 Whiteman, op. cit., footnote 143 (at 629, 659). 
225 McDougal & Burke, "Crisis in the Law of the Sea: Community Perspective 
Versus National Egoism," 67 Yale Law Journal 539, 588 (1958). 
